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NOTES
 
RIGHT TO COUNSEL/CRIMINAL LAW—WISHING FOR 
RIGHTS: INTERPRETING THE  ARTICLE 12 RIGHT TO  COUNSEL IN 
MASSACHUSETTS IN THE AFTERMATH OF MONTEJO V. LOUISIANA 
INTRODUCTION 
Factually, little separated Jesse Montejo from Robert Jackson 
and Rudy Bladel.1  All were charged with murder and appointed 
counsel at their respective arraignments.2  Before Montejo, Jack­
son, or Bladel had the opportunity to meet their attorneys, the po­
lice sought them out for interrogation purposes, even though all 
three had been vigorously interrogated prior to arraignment.3  At 
the police-initiated interrogation, still prior to meeting their attor­
neys, Montejo, Jackson, and Bladel signed Miranda waivers4 and 
thereafter made confessions that were admitted into evidence 
1. Montejo v. Louisiana, 129 S. Ct. 2079, 2082 (2009); Michigan v. Jackson, 475 
U.S. 625, 627-28 (1986), overruled by Montejo, 129 S. Ct. at 2079. 
2. Montejo, 129 S. Ct. at 2082; Jackson, 475 U.S. at 627-28. 
3. Montejo, 129 S. Ct. at 2082; Jackson, 475 U.S. at 627-28.  Prior to arraignment, 
detectives interrogated Jesse Montejo from the afternoon of September 6th into the 
early morning of September 7th. Montejo, 129 S. Ct. at 2082.  Prior to Bladel’s arraign­
ment, the police interrogated him the evening of his arrest. Jackson, 474 U.S. at 627. 
Notably, when Bladel was arraigned, the detective in charge of Bladel’s investigation 
was present and therefore knew of Bladel’s appointment of counsel. Id.  After Bladel’s 
arraignment he was taken back to the county jail, and three days later two police detec­
tives came to the jail to interrogate him. Id.  Similarly, Jackson was interrogated at 
length prior to his arraignment and during the arraignment the police involved in his 
investigation were present.  Therefore, the police were undoubtedly aware that Jackson 
had been appointed counsel. Id. at 628. 
4. Under Miranda v. Arizona, the Supreme Court created “prophylactic protec­
tion of the right against compelled self-incrimination.” Montejo, 129 S. Ct. at 2089 (cit­
ing Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 474 (1966)).  Under Miranda, a suspect in a 
custodial interrogation, before being questioned, must be informed that: “(1) they have 
the right to remain silent; (2) their statements may be used against them at trial; (3) 
they have the right to the presence of an attorney during questioning; and (4) if they 
cannot afford an attorney, one will be appointed.” Custodial Interrogations, 36 GEO. 
L.J. ANN. REV. CRIM. PROC. 168, 169 (2007).  A Miranda waiver occurs when an ac­
cused gives up his rights to remain silent and have counsel present during questioning. 
Charles Alan Wright & Andrew D. Leipold, The Miranda Rules—Waiver and Invoca­
tion of Miranda Rights, 1 FED. PRAC. & PROC. CRIM. § 76 (4th ed. 2010). Since June of 
2010, the Supreme Court has held that defendants’ silence is enough to constitute an 
163 
31827-w
ne_34-1 S
heet N
o. 86 S
ide B
      05/09/2012   13:22:53
31827-wne_34-1 Sheet No. 86 Side B      05/09/2012   13:22:53
C M
Y K
\\jciprod01\productn\W\WNE\34-1\WNE105.txt unknown Seq: 2  9-MAY-12 12:31
 
 
164 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:163 
against each of them at their individual trials;5 each was found 
guilty of murder.6  All three defendants appealed their convictions, 
and their cases made it to the United States Supreme Court.7 
Fortunately for Jackson and Bladel, their appeals were heard 
together in 1986, at a time when the Supreme Court concluded it 
was imperative to protect the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of the 
right to counsel.8  The Court held that both Jackson’s and Bladel’s 
Miranda waivers were invalid and that the police-initiated interro­
gations violated their Sixth Amendment rights.9  Finding the need 
to safeguard the Sixth Amendment, the Court established a bright-
line rule making post-arraignment waivers of a defendant’s right to 
counsel at a police-initiated interrogation presumptively invalid.10 
Fast-forward twenty-six years, to 2009, when the Supreme 
Court heard Jesse Montejo’s appeal.11  Montejo’s argument relied 
on the bright-line rule that had protected both Jackson’s and 
Bladel’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel.12  Unfortunately for 
Montejo the Court rejected his argument, and did away with the 
rule that was established twenty-six years earlier.13  Overruling the 
Jackson rule, the Supreme Court granted defendants in factually 
similar situations to Montejo, Jackson, and Bladel one glimmer of 
hope: “[i]f a State wishes,” it may continue to adhere to the Jackson 
rule under its state constitution.14 
While Montejo has affected “a sea change in the law,”15 the 
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court (SJC) has held that the Mas­
sachusetts Declaration of Rights can afford its citizens greater pro­
“implicit” Miranda waiver, thus eliminating the need for defendants to expressly waive 
their Miranda rights.  Berghuis v. Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. 2250, 2261 (2010). 
5. Montejo, 129 S. Ct. at 2082; Jackson, 475 U.S. at 627-28. 
6. Montejo, 129 S. Ct. at 2082; Jackson, 475 U.S. at 627-28. The most serious 
conviction was that of Jesse Montejo, who was convicted of first-degree murder and 
sentenced to death. Montejo, 129 S. Ct. at 2082. 
7. Montejo, 129 S. Ct. at 2082-83; Jackson, 475 U.S. at 627-28. 
8. See Jackson, 475 U.S. at 636 (finding the need for additional safeguards to 
protect a defendant’s assertion of the Sixth Amendment’s right to counsel at an 
arraignment). 
9. Id. at 635-36. 
10. See id. at 636. 
11. Montejo, 129 S. Ct. at 2079. 
12. See id. at 2082-83. 
13. Id. at 2091. 
14. Id. at 2089 (“If a State wishes to abstain from requesting interviews with rep­
resented defendants when counsel is not present, it obviously may continue to do so.”). 
15. Commonwealth v. Tlasek, 930 N.E.2d 170, 172 (Mass. App. Ct. 2010). The 
court used this phrase to describe the difference in the law pre-Montejo and post-
Montejo: 
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165 2012] RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN MASS. FOLLOWING MONTEJO 
tection than the Bill of Rights to the United States Constitution.16 
This holding gives the Massachusetts judiciary the power to stop the 
sea change and to protect the right to counsel, which is guaranteed 
to every criminal defendant in Article 12 of the Massachusetts Dec­
laration of Rights (Article 12).17  In order to protect the right to 
counsel, under the state constitution the Massachusetts judiciary 
should maintain the long-standing prohibition against police-initi­
ated interrogations of represented defendants outside the presence 
of their attorneys. 
Part I of this Note provides an overview of the concept of “ju­
dicial federalism,” and then takes a historical look at the Massachu­
setts Constitution.  Part I concludes with an in-depth evaluation of 
Article 12 and instances in which the SJC has afforded Massachu­
setts citizens greater protection than the Sixth Amendment.  Part II 
focuses on United States Supreme Court decisions interpreting the 
Sixth Amendment leading up to Michigan v. Jackson, and Jackson’s 
subsequent overruling in Montejo v. Louisiana, and the repercus­
sions for the States.  Part III focuses on why it is imperative for the 
protection of a defendant’s Article 12 right to counsel that the SJC 
continue the prohibition on police-initiated post-arraignment inter­
rogations.  Finally, Part IV illuminates the broad implications of fol­
lowing Montejo, arguing that sound policy would be advanced by 
adherence to Massachusetts precedent. 
I. STATE COURT POWER AND THE
 
MASSACHUSETTS CONSTITUTION
 
Part I of this Note discusses judicial federalism, a concept that 
allows states, under their state constitutions, to provide their citi­
zens greater protection than the U.S. Constitution.18  This Part then 
delves into the ratification of the Massachusetts Constitution and 
At the time of the motion judge’s ruling, case law clearly established that, 
absent the consent of counsel, the police could not initiate an interrogation 
regarding a charge for which the Sixth Amendment right to counsel had at­
tached and been asserted, regardless of whether they had secured a valid Mi­
randa waiver. However, in May, 2009, the United States Supreme Court 
effected [sic] a sea change in the law when it overruled Michigan v. Jackson. 
Under Montejo, a valid Miranda waiver suffices to waive one’s Sixth Amend­
ment right to counsel. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
16. Commonwealth v. Hodge, 434 N.E.2d 1246, 1249 (Mass. 1982) (“The Massa­
chusetts Declaration of Rights can, and in this case does, provide greater safeguards 
than the Bill of Rights to the United States Constitution.”). 
17. MASS. CONST. pt. 1, art. XII. 
18. See infra Part I.A. 
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the history behind the right to counsel in Massachusetts, concluding 
with SJC decisions in which Article 12 has been held to be more 
expansive than the Sixth Amendment. 
A. American Federalism 
The Supremacy Clause requires states to afford their citizens 
“no fewer rights than the U.S. Constitution demands.”19  However, 
this mandate “do[es] no more than establish the minimum protec­
tion owed to individuals against state government actions.”20  State 
courts have the power, under their own constitutions, to provide 
greater protection than that afforded by the U.S. Constitution21 
through a process known as “judicial federalism.”22 
One of the best-known articles advocating for state courts to 
safeguard individual liberties through judicial federalism was writ­
ten by a Supreme Court Justice.23  In his famous and influential ar­
ticle, Justice Brennan called on state courts to not be satisfied with 
affording their citizens the “full protections of the federal Constitu­
19. Justin Long, Intermittent State Constitutionalism, 34 PEPP. L. REV. 41, 55 
(2006). 
20. Arthur Leavens, State Constitutionalism: State-Court Deference or Disso­
nance?, 33 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 81, 88-89 (2011) (recognizing that “[s]tate courts are 
free . . . to interpret and apply the provisions of their respective state constitutions that 
protect those same rights. If the state court interprets these protections to be greater 
than their federal counterparts, [they] prevail”). 
21. See Arkansas v. Sullivan, 532 U.S. 769, 772 (2001) (acknowledging that “a 
State is free as a matter of its own law to impose greater restrictions . . . than those this 
Court holds to be necessary upon federal constitutional standards”).  Not only is a state 
free to afford more protection, but Justice Brennan was of the belief 
that the decisions of the Court are not, and should not be, dispositive of ques­
tions regarding rights guaranteed by counterpart provisions of state law . . . . 
[F]or only if [the Court’s decisions] are found to be logically persuasive and 
well-reasoned, paying due regard to precedent and the policies underlying spe­
cific constitutional guarantees, may they properly claim persuasive weight as 
guideposts when interpreting counterpart state guarantees. 
William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 
HARV. L. REV. 489, 502 (1977). 
22. Robert K. Fitzpatrick, Neither Icarus Nor Ostrich: State Constitutions as an 
Independent Source of Individual Rights, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1833, 1834 (2004). 
23. Brennan, supra note 21, at 491.  Further, Brennan recognized his approval in 
the fact that 
more and more state courts are construing state constitutional counterparts of 
provisions of the Bill of Rights as guaranteeing citizens of their states even 
more protection than the federal provisions, even those identically phrased. 
This is surely an important and highly significant development for our consti­
tutional jurisprudence and for our concept of federalism. 
Id. at 495. 
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167 2012] RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN MASS. FOLLOWING MONTEJO 
tion” and nothing more.24  Brennan’s argument for judicial federal­
ism was supported by the fact that individual liberties guaranteed 
by state constitutions require protection that “often extend[s] be­
yond those required by the Supreme Court’s interpretation of fed­
eral law.”25  To protect constitutional liberties, federalism 
distributes significant power to both the state and federal govern­
ments, enabling “each to monitor and check the abuses of the 
other.”26  When a state court decides to exercise its power to afford 
citizens greater protection based on state constitutional provisions, 
the decision is “not even reviewable by, [sic] the Supreme Court of 
the United States.”27 
Considering this significant constitutional power given to the 
states, the question arises as to how state courts should exercise it.28 
This question becomes even more pronounced in a situation where 
the text of both the state and federal constitutional provisions are 
virtually identical29 and even more challenging when the Supreme 
Court has already interpreted the U.S. Constitution in a particular 
matter. 
There is much scholarly debate as to “whether states should 
develop their own constitutional traditions or should instead adhere 
to federal doctrines . . . [with] answers, ranging from always to 
sometimes to never.”30  Justice Brennan advocated that states 
should only defer to Supreme Court precedent when the decisions 
“are found to be logically persuasive and well-reasoned, paying due 
regard to precedent and the policies underlying specific constitu­
24. Id. at 491. 
25. Id. 
26. James A. Gardner, State Constitutional Rights As Resistance to National 
Power: Toward A Functional Theory of State Constitutions, 91 GEO. L.J. 1003, 1007 
(2003). 
27. Brennan, supra note 21, at 501.  This is because the United States Supreme 
Court is “utterly without jurisdiction to review such state decisions.” Id. 
28. See Leavens, supra note 20, at 89-92 (discussing when state judges should 
defer to Supreme Court precedent). 
29. See Robert A. Schapiro, Identity and Interpretation in State Constitutional 
Law, 84 VA. L. REV. 389, 390 (1998) (discussing a state’s constitutional “identity” which 
becomes central in a situation “concerning the construction of provisions in a state con­
stitution that mirror clauses in the Federal Constitution”); see also Arthur Leavens, 
Prophylactic Rules and State Constitutionalism, 44 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 415, 416 (2011) 
(“Boiled down, the question is, on what basis does a state court interpret a state consti­
tutional provision, couched in virtually the same language and often with the same his­
tory as that of its federal counterpart, and decide that the state provision provides 
greater protection?”). 
30. Schapiro, supra note 29, at 390. 
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168 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:163 
tional guarantees.”31  The remainder of this Note explores how the 
Massachusetts judiciary has addressed the issue of judicial federal­
ism in the context of the constitutional right to counsel, and recom­
mends that the Massachusetts judiciary continue adherence to 
Massachusetts precedent and afford their citizens greater protec­
tion than provided by Montejo v. Louisiana. 
B. The Massachusetts Constitution and Article 12 
When a state court exercises its power to afford greater consti­
tutional protection through judicial federalism, often the court will 
rely on state constitutional history as a basis for the exercise of this 
power.32  However, state courts rarely “resort to the state’s consti­
tutional history in the way that federal courts routinely do.”33  This 
section provides a brief discussion of the ratification of the Massa­
chusetts Constitution, not as a basis for the Massachusetts judiciary 
to exercise its power through judicial federalism, but rather in an 
effort to provide an understanding of the constitutional history be­
hind the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, before focusing on 
Article 12. 
The Massachusetts Constitution holds the distinction as the 
world’s oldest, still-governing constitution.34  Ratified in 1780,35 the 
31. Brennan, supra note 21, at 502. 
32. James A. Gardner, The Failed Discourse of State Constitutionalism, 90 MICH. 
L. REV. 761, 793 (1992). 
33. Id.  In Gardner’s article he analyzed seven different states, one of which was 
Massachusetts. Id.  Gardner noted that the Supreme Judicial Court has been silent on 
the Massachusetts Constitution’s history, leading to the conclusion that the court does 
not use the Massachusetts Constitution’s history as a basis “for divergent interpreta­
tions of the state constitution.” Id. But see Honorable Roderick L. Ireland, How We 
Do it in Massachusetts: An Overview of How the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court 
has Interpreted its State Constitution to Address Contemporary Legal Issues, 38 VAL. 
U.L. REV. 405, 407 (2004) (discussing that one of the SJC’s factors in deciding when to 
defer to the Supreme Court is the history of the constitution). 
34. Fitzpatrick, supra note 22, at 1834 (2004); see also BENJAMIN W. LABAREE, 
COLONIAL  MASSACHUSETTS–A HISTORY 308-09 (Milton M. Klein & Jacob E. Cooke 
eds., 1979) (“John [Adams] was in his element, having at last been given the opportu­
nity to put into practice the governmental theories he had cherished all his life . . . . 
During the autumn and winter of 1779-80 Adams would work a foundation for govern­
ment in Massachusetts that (with numerous amendments) is still in existence today, two 
centuries later.”). 
35. LABAREE, supra note 34, at 312.  The ratification of the Massachusetts Consti­
tution meant that, “[a]t long last Massachusetts had a constitution befitting its status as 
a free and independent state.” Id.  Before the constitution was ratified, it was sent to 
the towns for approval and accompanying the constitution was an address which set 
forth the principles which it was based on: “Only ‘by accommodating ourselves to each 
other, and individually yielding particular and ever favorite opinions of smaller moment 
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169 2012] RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN MASS. FOLLOWING MONTEJO 
Massachusetts Constitution was used as one of the models when the 
United States Constitution was drafted in 1787.36  Markedly, unlike 
other states whose constitutions were written and enacted by the 
state legislatures, the Massachusetts Constitution was written by a 
special convention.37  This unique arrangement enabled the Massa­
chusetts Constitution to “draw its authority clearly and unequivo­
cally from the sovereign people.”38  Because the Massachusetts 
Constitution drew its authority directly from the people it embod­
ied their values and aspirations,39 making it truly a constitution by 
the people. 
The Massachusetts Constitution consists of three distinct parts: 
the Preamble, the Declaration of Rights, and the Frame of Govern­
ment.40  The Preamble ends with the statement: “We . . . the people 
of Massachusetts . . . do agree upon, ordain and establish, the fol­
lowing,” which was later incorporated into the U.S. Constitution.41 
The Declaration of Rights was “the predecessor to the federal Bill 
of Rights . . . [and] was long regarded by the Supreme Judicial 
to essential principles . . . would Massachusetts soon ‘be blessed with such a constitution 
as those are intitled [sic] to, who have struggled hard for freedom and independence.’” 
Id. at 309. 
36. Ireland, supra note 33, at 407; see also Commonwealth v. Upton, 476 N.E.2d 
548, 555 (Mass. 1985) (acknowledging that“[t]he Constitution of the Commonwealth 
preceded and is independent of the Constitution of the United States. In fact, portions 
of the Constitution of the United States are based on provisions in the Constitution of 
the Commonwealth”); PAULINE MAIER, RATIFICATION 140 (2010). 
37. MAIER, supra note 36, at 139.  The constitution that was adopted in 1780 was 
not the first constitution to be written in Massachusetts. Id.  Interestingly, the first Mas­
sachusetts Constitution was drafted by the legislature in 1778, and was unequivocally 
rejected by the people of Massachusetts. Id. at 138-39.  One of the most significant 
problems with the 1778 constitution was that it was drafted by the legislature, “[a]s the 
town of Concord explained, the body that forms a constitution has a right to alter it, and 
a constitution that can be changed by the legislature gives the people no security against 
legislative encroachments on their rights.” Id. at 139. 
38. Id. (“The idea that government received its authority from the people was not 
new . . . .  In 1780, however, Massachusetts transformed popular sovereignty from a 
theory to a process.”). 
39. LABAREE, supra note 34, at 313 (“To a remarkable degree the Constitution of 
1780 reflected the values and endorsed the aspirations expressed by the generations of 
inhabitants who had helped build the commonwealth.”). 
40. Notably, the third part of the Massachusetts Constitution, dealing with the 
frame of government, was unique because, “[o]nly in Massachusetts did the constitution 
feature three separate articles (‘chapters’) for the three main branches of government.” 
AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION 207 (2005). 
41. MAIER, supra note 36, at 140. 
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Court as a freestanding and vibrant source of protections for indi­
viduals against the power of the state.”42 
Contained in the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, under 
Article 12, is the right of all criminal defendants to have the aid and 
advice of counsel for his or her defense.43  The right to counsel pro­
vision provides that: “every subject shall have a right . . . to be fully 
heard in his defence by himself, or his council [sic], at his elec­
tion.”44  The SJC has found that the right to be assisted by counsel 
is imperative “to insure fundamental human rights of life and lib­
erty.  It is a right accorded to every defendant, rich or poor.”45 
While Article 12 is similar to the Sixth Amendment in that the Sixth 
Amendment provides: “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused 
shall enjoy the right to . . . have the Assistance of Counsel for his 
defense,”46 the SJC has consistently stated “that the right to be as­
sisted effectively by counsel is independently guaranteed by art. 
12.”47 
C. The Right to Counsel in Massachusetts 
Much like the Massachusetts Constitution preceded the adop­
tion of the United States Constitution, Massachusetts was also 
ahead of the U.S. Constitution regarding the appointment of coun­
sel to indigent criminal defendants.48  In 1958, the SJC adopted 
Rule 10–to be followed by the superior courts–mandating the ap­
pointment of counsel in all non-capital felony cases.49  Rule 10’s re­
quirement of the appointment of counsel came “five years before 
42. Mary L. Bonauto, Goodridge in Context, 40 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 25 
(2005). 
43. MASS. CONST. pt. 1, art. XII; Guerin v. Commonwealth, 162 N.E.2d 38, 40 
(Mass. 1959) (“The fundamental character of the right of a person accused of a serious 
crime to have the aid and advice of counsel is recognized under the . . . [Massachusetts] 
Constitution, art. 12 of the Declaration of Rights.”). 
44. MASS. CONST. pt. 1, art. XII. 
45. Commonwealth v. Appleby, 450 N.E.2d 1070, 1076 (Mass. 1983) (emphasis 
added) (citations omitted). 
46. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
47. Commonwealth v. Hodge, 434 N.E.2d 1246, 1249 (Mass. 1982) (citing Com­
monwealth v. Soffen, 368 N.E.2d 1030 (Mass. 1979); Commonwealth v. Davis, 384 
N.E.2d 181 (Mass. 1978); Commonwealth v. Leslie, 382 N.E.2d 1072 (Mass. 1978)). 
48. Herbert P. Wilkins, Judicial Treatment of the Massachusetts Declaration of 
Rights in Relation to Cognate Provisions of the United States Constitution, 14 SUFFOLK. 
U. L. REV. 887, 888 (1980). 
49. Rules of Court, 337 Mass. 812, 813 (1958) (“If a defendant charged with a 
noncapital felony appears in the Superior Court without counsel, the court shall advise 
him of his right to counsel and assign counsel to represent him at every stage of the 
proceeding . . . .”). 
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[the United States Supreme Court, in] Gideon v. Wainwright, im­
posed that obligation on the States.”50 
While Rule 10 made it an absolute right of a defendant 
charged with a felony to have counsel at every stage of the proceed­
ing, Rule 10 also acknowledged “the inherent discretionary power 
of any court to appoint counsel” to any indigent defendant regard­
less of the crime charged.51  In 1964, the SJC took Rule 10 one step 
further, expanding it to include indigent defendants who were 
charged with any crime, felony or misdemeanor, in which imprison­
ment might result.52  It was not until 1972, in Argersinger v. Hamlin, 
that the Supreme Court afforded indigent criminal defendants the 
same right under the U.S. Constitution.53 
D. Article 12 Precedent 
Since 1958, when the SJC adopted Rule 10, the Massachusetts 
judiciary has continued to be proactive in affording Massachusetts 
citizens the right to have legal counsel, going so far as interpreting 
the Massachusetts Constitution more expansively than the U.S. 
Constitution.54  The Chief Justice of the SJC, Roderick Ireland, 
once stated that the SJC often defers to the Supreme Court, but has 
the power to interpret the Massachusetts Constitution more expan­
sively than the Supreme Court interprets “basically the same lan­
50. Commonwealth v. Rainwater, 681 N.E.2d 1218, 1227 (Mass. 1997) (citation 
omitted), abrogated by Texas v. Cobb, 532 U.S. 162, 168 (2001). In Gideon, the United 
States Supreme Court recognized for the first time that the Sixth Amendment’s guaran­
tee of the right to counsel is a fundamental right, thus made “obligatory upon the States 
by the Fourteenth Amendment.”  Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342 (1963). The 
court reasoned that, “[n]ot only these precedents but also reason and reflection require 
us to recognize that in our adversary system of criminal justice, any person haled into 
court, who is too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial unless counsel is 
provided for him.” Id. at 344. 
51. Edward J. Duggan, Counsel for the Indigent Defendant in Massachusetts, 2 
BOSTON BAR J. 23, 24 (1958).  At the time Massachusetts adopted Rule 10, thirty-nine 
other states also required the appointment of counsel for indigent defendants in non-
capital felony cases. Id. at 28. 
52. Rainwater, 681 N.E.2d at 1227.  The amended text of Rule 10 stated: 
If a defendant charged with a crime, for which a sentence of imprisonment 
may be imposed, appears in any court without counsel, the judge shall advise 
him of his right to counsel and assign counsel to represent him at every stage 
of the proceeding unless he elects to proceed without counsel or is able to 
obtain counsel. 
Rules of Court, 347 Mass. 808, 809 (1964). 
53. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37 (1972) (“[N]o person may be impris­
oned for any offense, whether classified as petty, misdemeanor, or felony, unless he was 
represented by counsel at his trial.”). 
54. See infra note 58 and accompanying text. 
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172 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:163 
guage in the United States Constitution.”55  Chief Justice Ireland 
explained that the SJC uses a “blended” methodology in determin­
ing whether to defer to the Supreme Court.56  This methodology 
takes into consideration the history of the Massachusetts Constitu­
tion, text, prior interpretations, and jurisprudence already existing 
in the Commonwealth and other states.57  In applying that method­
ology the SJC has, in numerous instances, interpreted the Article 12 
right to counsel provision to provide greater protection than the 
Sixth Amendment.58 
The SJC has also been proactive in taking steps to ensure that 
indigent criminal defendants have all of the benefits that accom­
pany legal representation.59  To this end, the court has strived to 
give meaning to their words that “[t]he right to counsel means the 
right to effective assistance of counsel.”60  The court’s efforts to en­
sure that a defendant receives effective representation can be 
traced to the court’s broad protective approach to the attorney-cli­
ent relationship.61 
One of the SJC’s attempts to safeguard the right to have the 
assistance of counsel appears in Commonwealth v. Mavredakis, 
where the SJC imposed a duty on police to inform an accused of his 
attorney’s effort to render assistance.62  The Supreme Court had al­
ready decided the issue and held that under the Fifth and Sixth 
55. Ireland, supra note 33, at 407 (quoting District Attorney for the Suffolk Dis­
trict v. Watson, 411 N.E.2d 1247, 1300 (Mass. 1980)). 
56. Id. at 409. 
57. Id.; see also D. Christopher Dearborn, “You Have the Right to an Attorney,” 
but Not Right Now: Combating Miranda’s Failure by Advancing the Point of Attachment 
Under Article XII of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, 44 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 
359, 400-01 (2011) (discussing the factors the SJC uses when interpreting the Massachu­
setts Constitution to provide greater protection than the United States Constitution). 
58. See Commonwealth v. Murphy, 862 N.E.2d 30, 41 (Mass. 2007); Common­
wealth v. Mavredakis, 725 N.E.2d 169, 178-179 (Mass. 2000); Commonwealth v. Hodge, 
434 N.E.2d 1246, 1249 (Mass. 1982). 
59. Commonwealth v. Rainwater, 681 N.E.2d 1218, 1227 (Mass. 1997), abrogated 
by Texas v. Cobb, 532 U.S. 162, 168 (2001). . 
60. Lavallee v. Justices in the Hampden Superior Court, 812 N.E.2d 895, 903 
(Mass. 2004). 
61. Murphy, 862 N.E.2d at 42 (discussing the court’s efforts in protecting the at-
torney-client relationship). 
62. Mavredakis, 725 N.E.2d at 179.  The SJC saw a concrete and substantive dif­
ference between “the abstract right to speak with an attorney mentioned in the Mi­
randa warnings, and a concrete opportunity to meet ‘with an identified attorney 
actually able to provide at least initial assistance and advice.’” Id. at 178. The court 
believes that the absence of a duty to inform would encourage and tacitly condone, 
“affirmative police interference with the attorney-client relationship.” Id. at 179. 
31827-w
ne_34-1 S
heet N
o. 91 S
ide A
      05/09/2012   13:22:53
31827-wne_34-1 Sheet No. 91 Side A      05/09/2012   13:22:53
C M
Y K
\\jciprod01\productn\W\WNE\34-1\WNE105.txt unknown Seq: 11  9-MAY-12 12:31
173 2012] RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN MASS. FOLLOWING MONTEJO 
Amendments the police had no such duty.63  The SJC looked to the 
prior interpretations of Article 12, which had afforded more protec­
tion than the U.S. Constitution, and concluded that in this instance 
Article 12 “requires a higher standard of protection.”64  The court 
reasoned that it “prefer[s] to view the ‘role of the lawyer . . . as an 
aid to the understanding and protection of constitutional rights,’ 
rather than ‘as a nettlesome obstacle to the pursuit of wrongdo­
ers.’”65  The court’s opinion in Mavredakis is just one piece of evi­
dence establishing the SJC’s efforts to ensure that criminal 
defendants have the benefit of the assistance of counsel. 
The SJC has taken steps to ensure that when a defendant has 
the assistance of counsel, that assistance is effective.66  In Common­
wealth v. Hodge, the defendant, Hodge, alleged ineffective assis­
tance of counsel.67  Under Supreme Court precedent, the defendant 
had the burden of proving that there was an actual conflict of inter­
est that adversely affected his counsel’s performance.68  Conversely, 
the SJC held that Hodge only had to show that there was a conflict, 
not that the conflict adversely affected his counsel’s performance.69 
The court reasoned that “such a fundamental right should not de­
63. Id. at 176 (“In Moran [v. Burbine] the United States Supreme Court ruled 
that, under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments . . . the police had no duty to inform a 
suspect of an attorney’s efforts to render legal services when the suspect had not per­
sonally requested such legal representation.”). 
64. Id. at 178-79.  In regard to the text of Article 12, the court concluded that 
“[t]he precise wording of art.12 was a subject of debate at the Constitutional Conven­
tion of 1779-1780 [and i]t is a standard principle of constitutional interpretation that 
‘[a]ll [the] words [of the Constitution] must be presumed to have been chosen advis­
edly.’” Id. at 178 (citation omitted) (quoting Town of Mount Washington v. Cook, 192 
N.E. 464, 465 (Mass. 1934)).  The court went on to note that the text of Article 12 has 
often been interpreted broadly. Id. at 178. 
65. Id. at 179 (citation omitted) (quoting Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 468 
(1986)).  Viewing the role of the lawyer in that light, the court acknowledged that ‘the 
day is long past . . . where attorneys must shout legal advice to their clients, held in 
custody, through the jailhouse door.’” Id. (quoting People v. McCauley, 645 N.E.2d 
923, 929 (Ill. 1994)). 
66. See generally Commonwealth v. Hodge, 434 N.E.2d 1246, 1247 (Mass. 1982) 
(holding that the defendant was denied the effective assistance of counsel because his 
attorney had a conflict of interest throughout the representation). 
67. Id. at 1248-49. 
68. In Cuyler v. Sullivan the United Stated Supreme Court held that the Sixth 
Amendment required that the defendant present evidence that there was an actual con­
flict of interest, and that the conflict thereafter adversely affected the defendant’s attor­
ney’s performance.  Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 348 (1980). 
69. Hodge, 434 N.E.2d at 1249.  The court started with the Supreme Court’s stan­
dard set out in Cuyler, and then held that even if the defendant could not meet the 
burden of Cuyler, the court’s inquiry was not complete, because in this instance Article 
12 provides broader protection than that set out in Cuyler. Id. 
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174 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:163 
pend upon a defendant’s ability to meet such an impossible burden” 
to entitle him to a new trial under Article 12.70 
The SJC’s efforts to safeguard the attorney-client relationship 
were apparent in both Commonwealth v. Hilton71 and Common­
wealth v. Howard.72  In both cases the court provided concrete 
meaning to the Supreme Court’s proscription against any “‘know­
ing exploitation by the State of an opportunity to confront the ac­
cused without counsel being present.’”73  In Hilton, the court held 
that a court officer must be viewed as a government agent for pur­
poses of determining a violation of the right to counsel.74  Thus, the 
court concluded that questioning by a court officer outside the pres­
ence of a defendant’s attorney would be an effort to circumvent the 
Sixth Amendment and a violation of the Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel.75  Similarly, in Howard, the court held that an investigator 
with the Department of Social Services had, because of her status as 
a government agent, engaged in “prohibited governmental interro­
gation” of the defendant.76 
In dealing with other provisions of Article 12, the SJC has simi­
larly found Article 12 to be more expansive than the Sixth Amend­
ment.77  In Commonwealth v. Amirault, it was the defendant’s 
position that Article 12 provided greater protection than the Sixth 
Amendment and “by its very words, guarantee[d] a defendant a 
face-to-face confrontation.”78  Based on this, the defendant argued 
that a unique seating arrangement used for child witnesses denied 
him the right to confront the witness against him, face-to-face, 
70. Id. 
71. Commonwealth v. Hilton, 823 N.E.2d 383, 400 (Mass. 2005). 
72. Commonwealth v. Howard, 845 N.E.2d 368, 372 (Mass. 2006). 
73. Commonwealth v. Murphy, 862 N.E.2d 30, 42 (Mass. 2007) (quoting Maine v. 
Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 176 (1985)). 
74. Hilton, 823 N.E.2d at 400. 
75. Id. at 401.  The court reached this decision by placing emphasis on the rules 
set out in Massiah and its progeny, which stand for the proposition that after the Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel attaches anyone acting on the government’s behalf is for­
bidden from eliciting information from the accused. Id. at 399.  By including court of­
ficers in the group of government officials the prohibition applies to, the court put to 
rest the concern that secret interrogation tantamount to government interrogations 
would be taking place. Id. at 399. 
76. Commonwealth v. Howard, 845 N.E.2d 368, 372-73 (Mass. 2006). The court’s 
decision in Howard was based on the principles set forth in Hilton. Id. at 372.  Again, 
the court relied on the Supreme Court’s command in Massiah and the ever-present 
concern with “the constitutional implications of questioning on matters concerning 
pending charges” by agents of the state. Id. 
77. Commonwealth v. Amirault, 677 N.E.2d 652, 660 (Mass. 1997). 
78. See id. at 658. 
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thereby violating Article 12.79  The court agreed with the defendant 
and held that Article 12 was broader than the Sixth Amendment in 
that it guaranteed a defendant a face-to-face confrontation.80 
In contrast to the cases in which the SJC has found that Article 
12 was more expansive than the Sixth Amendment, in Common­
wealth v. Whelton, the SJC deferred to the Supreme Court’s reading 
of the Sixth Amendment.81 Whelton examined whether the admis­
sion of hearsay evidence, under the spontaneous utterance excep­
tion, without a showing that the declarants were unavailable, 
violated the defendant’s Article 12 right to confront the witnesses 
against him.82  The court considered its prior holdings, finding it dis-
positive that in regards to the hearsay rule, it had consistently held 
“that art. 12 provide[d] no greater protection than the Sixth 
Amendment.”83  The court also placed emphasis on the fact that 
the defendant failed to provide any evidence to support his position 
that “art. 12 provide[d] greater protection against hearsay than the 
Sixth Amendment.”84  Therefore, the court concluded that in this 
instance, Article 12 was not more expansive than the Sixth 
Amendment.85 
II. THE SIXTH AMENDMENT, BEFORE AND AFTER
 
MONTEJO V. LOUISIANA
 
The SJC’s precedent regarding the Article 12 right to counsel 
discussed in Part I.D establishes that the SJC has taken a broad 
protective approach to the right to counsel. This approach stems 
from safeguarding the attorney-client relationship and a defen­
dant’s right to rely on the assistance of counsel at all critical stages 
of a criminal prosecution, including post-arraignment interroga­
79. Id. at 656. 
80. Id. at 662 (holding that “[w]e have no doubt that the seating arrangements in 
these cases violated the confrontation rights of the accused under art. 12 . . . [t]he wit­
ness must give his testimony to the accused’s face, and that did not happen here”). 
81. Commonwealth v. Whelton, 696 N.E.2d 540, 545 (Mass. 1998). The spontane­
ous utterance exception to the hearsay rule allows an otherwise inadmissible statement 
to be admitted into evidence “‘if its utterance was spontaneous to a degree which rea­
sonably negated premeditation or possible fabrication and if it tended to qualify, char­
acterize and explain the underlying event.’” Id. at 544 (quoting Commonwealth v. 
Crawford, 629 N.E.2d 1332, 1334 (Mass. 1994)). 
82. Id. at 543. 
83. Id. at 545. 
84. Id. 
85. Id. (holding “that art. 12, like the Sixth Amendment . . . does not require a 
showing that the declarant is unavailable to testify at trial before a statement is admit­
ted under the spontaneous utterance exception to the rule against hearsay”). 
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tions.  For a more complete understanding of the SJC’s approach, it 
is necessary to compare Article 12 with the Sixth Amendment, and 
the Supreme Court’s decision in Montejo v. Louisiana.86  This Note 
argues that application of the Montejo decision in Massachusetts 
courts would be inconsistent with the SJC’s efforts to protect Arti­
cle 12, and that therefore the Massachusetts judiciary should con­
tinue to afford Massachusetts citizens greater protection than their 
federal counterparts. 
Part II discusses both the past and present state of federal law 
in the right to counsel context beginning with the Supreme Court’s 
interpretations of the Sixth Amendment and ending with the 
Court’s opinion in Montejo v. Louisiana.87  On the journey to 
Montejo, this section addresses Maine v. Moulton88 and Michigan v. 
Jackson;89 cases decided a year apart during a time when the Su­
preme Court placed limits on the government’s efforts to circum­
vent the right to counsel.  This section then concludes with a recent 
Massachusetts case that grapples with the implications that Montejo 
has for state courts. 
A. The Road to Michigan v. Jackson 
Under Supreme Court precedent, the Sixth Amendment at­
taches once adversarial proceedings have been initiated against a 
defendant, and guarantees a defendant the right to “have counsel 
present at all ‘critical’ stages of the criminal proceedings.”90  Be­
cause the Court views the arraignment as the initiation of adver­
sarial proceedings against an accused, the arraignment is considered 
the event that triggers the Sixth Amendment’s protection.91  After 
an arraignment, “the adverse positions of government and defen­
dant have solidified” and the defendant is “immersed in the intrica­
86. Montejo v. Louisiana, 129 S. Ct. 2079, 2091 (2009). 
87. Id. 
88. Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 180 (1985). 
89. Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625, 636 (1986), overruled by Montejo, 129 S. 
Ct. at 2091. 
90. Montejo, 129 S. Ct. at 2085.  Stressing the importance of the Sixth Amend­
ment right to counsel the Court has stated that: “[t]he right to the assistance of counsel 
guaranteed by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments is indispensable to the fair ad­
ministration of our adversarial system of criminal justice.” Moulton, 474 U.S. at 168-69. 
91. Jackson, 475 U.S at 629. 
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177 2012] RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN MASS. FOLLOWING MONTEJO 
cies of substantive and procedural criminal law,”92 complexities 
which the law presumes a defendant cannot handle on his own.93 
In Maine v. Moulton, the Supreme Court placed limits on the 
investigatory rights of the government by holding that once the 
Sixth Amendment attaches the government has “an affirmative ob­
ligation to respect” it.94  That affirmative obligation mandates that 
the government cannot “act in a manner that circumvents” the 
Sixth Amendment95 and assures the defendant “the right to rely on 
counsel as a ‘medium’ between him and the state.”96  The Court in 
Moulton acknowledged the government’s investigatory right after 
arraignment, but held that it is limited by, and must yield to, the 
defendant’s right to counsel.97  Therefore if the government, in an 
effort to investigate an accused, knowingly and intentionally cir­
cumvents the defendant’s right to counsel, the government has vio­
lated the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right.98 
A year after the Supreme Court set out the boundaries of the 
right to counsel in Moulton, the Court placed further limits on the 
government’s investigatory rights under the Sixth Amendment in 
Michigan v. Jackson.99  The Jackson Court addressed whether the 
defendants “validly waived their right to counsel at the post-ar­
92. Moulton, 474 U.S. at 170 (quoting United States v. Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180, 189 
(1984)). 
93. See Jackson, 475 U.S. at 633 n.7. 
94. Moulton, 474 U.S. at 171.  The Court further stated “[o]nce the right to coun­
sel has attached and been asserted, the State must of course honor it. This means more 
than simply that the State cannot prevent the accused from obtaining the assistance of 
counsel.” Id. at 170-71. 
95. Id. at 171.  To this end, “[t]he determination whether particular action by 
state agents violates the accused’s right to the assistance of counsel must be made in 
light” of the affirmative obligation not to circumvent the accused’s right to counsel. Id. 
at 176.  Applying this standard, the Court in Moulton held that the defendant’s Sixth 
Amendment right was violated when the police arranged to record conversations be­
tween the defendant and an agent of the state. Id. 
96. Id. 
97. See id. 
98. Id.  The policy behind this type of rule is to prevent “abuse by law enforce­
ment personnel in the form of fabricated investigations [thereby] risk[ing] the eviscera­
tion of the Sixth Amendment right.” Id. at 180.  To this end, the Court—quoting from 
Spano v. New York—inquired “‘what use is a defendant’s right to effective counsel at 
every stage of a criminal case if, while he is held awaiting trial, he can be questioned in 
the absence of counsel until he confesses?’” Id. at 171 (quoting Spano v. New York, 
360 U.S. 315, 326 (1959)). 
99. See generally Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625, 636 (1986), overruled by 
Montejo v. Louisiana, 129 S. Ct. 2079, 2091 (2009) (holding that any waiver made by a 
defendant of the right to counsel in a post-arraignment police-initiated interrogation is 
invalid). 
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178 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:163 
raignment custodial interrogations.”100  This issue prompted the 
Court to consider whether the rule established in Edwards v. Ari­
zona, aimed at protecting Fifth Amendment rights, applied equally 
to a Sixth Amendment context.101  The rule in Edwards prohibited 
police from further interrogating a suspect in custody once the sus­
pect had invoked his right to speak with an attorney.102 
After considering the applicability of the Edwards rule, the 
Court looked at the lawyer’s role in the post-arraignment con­
text.103  The Court stressed that the justifications for not allowing 
police to interrogate unrepresented suspects after they have asked 
to speak with a lawyer are even stronger once adversarial proceed­
ings have been initiated and a lawyer has been appointed.104  Rely­
ing on Maine v. Moulton’s holding that affords defendants the right 
to rely on their attorney as an intermediary between them and the 
government,105 the Court stated that after an accused has been 
charged, the right to counsel mandates that “the police may no 
longer employ techniques for eliciting information from an uncoun­
seled defendant that might have been entirely proper at an earlier 
100. Id. at 630.  There was no issue in Jackson over whether the defendant had a 
right to counsel at the post-arraignment police-initiated interrogation because “[t]he 
existence of that right is clear.  It has two sources. The Fifth Amendment protection 
against compelled self-incrimination provides the right to counsel at custodial interroga­
tions.  The Sixth Amendment guarantee of the assistance of counsel also provides the 
right to counsel at post-arraignment interrogations.” Id. at 629 (citation omitted). 
101. Id. at 626.  The rule established in Edwards was rooted in the Fifth Amend­
ment’s protection against self-incrimination and the request for counsel in Edwards was 
made directly to the police during the custodial interrogation. Id. at 630.  In contrast to 
Edwards, the defendant in Jackson, made his request for counsel to the judge during 
the arraignment, “and the basis for the Michigan Supreme Court opinion was the Sixth 
Amendment’s guarantee of the assistance of counsel” not the Fifth Amendment as in 
Edwards. Id. 
102. Id. at 626. 
103. Id. at 631-33.  The government had argued in Jackson that applying an Ed­
wards rule to a Sixth Amendment context would not be appropriate due to the “differ­
ences in the legal principles underlying the Fifth and Sixth Amendments.” Id. at 631. 
The Court disagreed with the government, stating that the purpose behind the Edwards 
rule, protecting an unrepresented accused, is just as, if not more important in a Sixth 
Amendment context when the accused is now a represented defendant. Id.  Therefore, 
the court determined that post-arraignment interrogations, require at least as much pro­
tection as is given in a pre-arraignment interrogation. Id. at 632. 
104. Id. at 631. 
105. Id. at 632 (quoting Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 176 (1985)). The Court 
reasoned that after formal proceedings have been initiated the individual goes from 
being a “suspect” to an “accused”—entitling the accused to more constitutional protec­
tion. Id. 
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179 2012] RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN MASS. FOLLOWING MONTEJO 
stage of their investigation.”106  The Court then created a bright-
line rule, analogous to the rule in Edwards, prohibiting police-initi­
ated post-arraignment interrogations and making any waiver of the 
right to counsel in such interrogations presumptively invalid.107 
B. The Downfall of Jackson: Montejo v. Louisiana 
The Jackson bright-line rule prohibiting police-initiated post-
arraignment interrogations met its demise in 2009 when the Su­
preme Court, sua sponte,108 considered whether Jackson should be 
overruled.109  In Montejo v. Louisiana, the defendant, Jesse 
Montejo, was arrested in connection with a murder and robbery 
and was appointed counsel at a preliminary hearing as required 
under Louisiana state law.110  Later that same day, the police went 
to the prison where Montejo was being held and  convinced him to 
accompany them on an expedition to find the murder weapon.111 
Thereafter, Montejo signed a Miranda waiver, waiving his right to 
have counsel present, and during the expedition wrote an inculpa­
tory letter of apology that was admitted into evidence at his trial.112 
Notably, Montejo did not meet his court-appointed attorney until 
after he returned from the police excursion and wrote the inculpa­
tory letter.113 
106. Id.  After laying out the principles as to why a defendant should be entitled 
to just as much Sixth Amendment constitutional protection as a suspect, the Court con­
cluded that, “the difference between the legal basis for the rule applied in Edwards and 
the Sixth Amendment claim asserted in these cases actually provides additional support 
for the application of the rule in these circumstances.” Id. 
107. Id. at 635.  Relying on Edwards for the decision, the Court said: “[j]ust as 
written waivers are insufficient to justify police-initiated interrogations after the request 
for counsel in a Fifth Amendment analysis, so too they are insufficient to justify police-
initiated interrogations after the request for counsel in a Sixth Amendment analysis.” 
Id.  It is important to note that under Edwards, and Jackson, if the accused initiates 
“communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police,” subsequent to his invo­
cation of the right to counsel, the waiver can be deemed valid. Id. at 626 (quoting 
Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484-85 (1981)). What both Edwards and Jackson 
protect against, are police-initiated interrogations. Id. 
108. The term sua sponte means “[w]ithout prompting or suggestion; on its own 
motion.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1560 (9th ed. 2009). 
109. Montejo v. Louisiana, 129 S. Ct. 2079, 2088 (2009). 
110. Id. at 2082.  At the preliminary hearing, the judge appointed Montejo an 
attorney without a request by Montejo; Montejo stood mute during the entire proceed­
ing. Id. at 2083. 
111. Id. at 2082. 
112. Id.  Montejo objected to the admittance of the letter of apology at trial. Id. 
113. Id. (emphasis added) (“Only upon their return did Montejo finally meet his 
court-appointed attorney, who was quite upset that the detectives had interrogated his 
client in his absence.”). 
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Under the bright-line rule established in Jackson, Montejo’s 
waiver should have been presumptively invalid.114  However, the 
Supreme Court, in overruling Jackson, held that a defendant may 
waive his right to counsel as long as the waiver is made knowingly, 
voluntarily, and intelligently.115  In so holding, the majority rejected 
the dissent’s view that there was a categorical distinction between 
an unrepresented defendant and a represented one.116  The major­
ity reasoned that there are “three layers of prophylaxis” that pro­
tect the right to counsel in a custodial interrogation, and therefore 
the rule in Jackson was considered unnecessary.117 
The Court in Montejo believed overruling Jackson was appro­
priate because the slight benefits of the Jackson rule substantially 
outweighed the “costs to the truth-seeking process and the criminal 
justice system.”118  The Court stated that the purpose of Jackson 
was to prevent police from badgering represented defendants into 
waiving their right to counsel, which was adequately served by Mi­
randa and Edwards.119  Under Miranda and Edwards, if a repre­
sented defendant did not want to speak to the police outside his 
counsel’s presence, all he had to do was say so.120  The main cost 
the Court saw was that the rule deterred the government from at­
tempting to obtain voluntary confessions, thus making it more 
114. Id. at 2083.  The Louisiana Supreme Court distinguished Jackson, pointing 
out that Jackson required the defendant to request the appointment of an attorney 
before its protections were triggered. Id.  Since the judge appointed Montejo counsel 
without a request by Montejo, Jackson’s protections were not triggered. Id. 
115. Id. at 2091-92. 
116. Id. at 2092.  Justice Stevens writing for the dissent believed that, “[i]f a de­
fendant is entitled to protection from police-initiated interrogation under the Sixth 
Amendment when he merely requests a lawyer, he is even more obviously entitled to 
such protection when he has secured a lawyer.” Id. at 2095 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
117. Id. at 2090. 
Under Miranda’s prophylactic protection of the right against compelled self-
incrimination, any suspect subject to custodial interrogation has the right to 
have a lawyer present if he so requests, and to be advised of that right.  Under 
Edwards’s prophylactic protection of the Miranda right, once such a defen­
dant “has invoked his right to have counsel present,” interrogation must stop. 
And under Minnick’s prophylactic protection of the Edwards right, no subse­
quent interrogation may take place until counsel is present, “whether or not 
the accused has consulted with his attorney.” 
Id. at 2089-90 (citations omitted) (quoting Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484 
(1981)). 
118. Id. at 2091. 
119. Id. at 2089-90. 
120. Id. 
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181 2012] RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN MASS. FOLLOWING MONTEJO 
likely that the guilty would go free.121  Therefore, the Court con­
cluded, the Jackson rule did not “pay its way.”122 
Justice Stevens authored the majority opinion in Jackson and 
wrote a strong dissent in Montejo.123  Writing for the dissent, Justice 
Stevens reasoned that the purpose of the Jackson rule was not to 
prevent police badgering, but rather “to safeguard a defendant’s 
right to rely on the assistance of counsel.”124  Further, because the 
decision to waive the right to counsel is a “momentous one,” Justice 
Stevens believed that Miranda warnings, while adequate to inform 
Montejo of his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent, were insuf­
ficient to ensure that Montejo was aware of the consequences of 
waiving his Sixth Amendment right to counsel.125  Stevens thought 
that the majority’s decision to overrule Jackson caused irreparable 
harm to the “integrity of the . . . right to counsel,” and that even 
under pre-Jackson law, Montejo’s Sixth Amendment right to coun­
sel was violated.126 
C. Montejo’s Applicability to the States 
State courts have been grappling with the Montejo decision127 
due to the substantial change it wrought in Sixth Amendment 
121. Id. at 2090-91. 
122. Id. at 2091 (quoting United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 906 n.6 (1984)). 
Notably, the decision in Montejo was 5-4. Id. at 2081. 
123. Id. at 2101 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625, 626 
(1986), overruled by Montejo, 129 S. Ct. at 2092. 
124. Montejo, 129 S. Ct. at 2097 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  Stevens also stated that 
Jackson’s purpose was to “‘protec[t] the unaided layman at critical confrontations with 
his adversary’ by giving him ‘the right to rely on counsel as a ‘medium’ between 
him[self] and the State.’” Id. at 2096 (quoting Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625, 631­
32 (1985)). 
125. Id. at 2100-01.  Stevens believed that the Majority accused Jackson of doing 
the same thing the Majority did with their holding in Montejo: blurring the line between 
the Fifth and Sixth Amendments. Id. at 2100.  The Majority “commit[ed] the same 
error by assuming that the Miranda warnings given in this case, designed purely to 
safeguard the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination, were somehow ade­
quate to protect Montejo’s more robust Sixth Amendment right to counsel.” Id. (em­
phasis added). 
126. Id. at 2101. The “pre-Jackson” law Stevens was referring to was the prece­
dent established in Maine v. Moulton that 
makes clear that “the Sixth Amendment is violated when the State obtains 
incriminating statements by knowingly circumventing the accused’s right to 
have counsel present in a confrontation between the accused and a state 
agent.” The Sixth Amendment entitles indicted defendants to have counsel 
notified of and present during critical confrontations with the state throughout 
the pretrial process. 
Id. at 2099 (citation omitted) (quoting Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 176 (1985)). 
127. See, e.g., Williams v. State, 38 So.3d 188, 190 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010). 
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182 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:163 
law.128  Explicit in the Montejo ruling is the right of each individual 
state to exercise its power through judicial federalism and continue, 
under the state constitution, “to abstain from requesting interviews 
with represented defendants when counsel is not present.”129  Thus, 
although Montejo resolved the issue under the Sixth Amendment, it 
did not resolve the issue under the parallel right to counsel provi­
sions in state constitutions.130 
Following the Supreme Court’s recognition that states could 
continue abstaining from police-initiation post-arraignment interro­
gations, the state court decisions have been split as to whether 
Montejo should be followed.131  The dispositive factor for the state 
courts has been whether the defendant has relied on the right to 
counsel provision in the state constitution or its federal counterpart, 
the Sixth Amendment.132  Notably, the power to afford greater pro­
tection under the state constitution has been fully discussed in only 
three state courts: Wisconsin,133 Florida,134 and Massachusetts.135 
128. See People v. Vickery, 229 P.3d 278, 281 (Colo. 2010) (recognizing that due 
to Montejo “[t]he Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel has undergone substantial changes”). 
129. See Montejo, 129 S. Ct. at 2089; see also Williams, 38 So.3d at 192 (“Al­
though Montejo resolved the issue under Sixth Amendment jurisprudence, the Su­
preme Court acknowledged that the states were free to continue prohibiting these types 
of police-initiated interrogations under their own constitutions.”). 
130. Williams, 38 So.3d at 192. 
131. Compare Vickery, 229 P.3d at 281 (holding Montejo should be followed), 
with Williams, 38 So.3d at 193 (considering “state constitutional claims . . . under the 
assumption that our high court will adhere to its precedent, despite Montejo”). 
132. See Ex parte Cooper, 43 So.3d 547, 548, 550-51 (Ala. 2009) (holding that 
after Montejo, when a defendant pursues a Sixth Amendment argument “a court must 
no longer presume a waiver of a right to counsel executed after the right to counsel has 
attached is invalid”); Vickery, 229 P.3d at 280-81 (holding that because Vickery argued 
that the interrogation violated Sixth Amendment rights, Montejo is controlling and 
“[a]fter Montejo we cannot presume waiver is involuntary simple because the defen­
dant is represented by counsel for pending charges”); Hughen v. State, 297 S.W.2d 330, 
335 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) (holding that due to defendant’s reliance on Jackson and 
the pursuit of a Sixth Amendment argument, Montejo is controlling, making defen­
dant’s waiver valid). 
133. State v. Forbush, 796 N.W.2d 741, 754-55 (Wis. 2011). In State v. Forbush, 
the trial court found that the post-arraignment, police-initiated interrogation of Forbush 
violated his right to counsel, but the appellate court, relying on Montejo, reversed the 
decision. Id. at 754.  The case then made it to the Wisconsin Supreme Court where the 
court read Montejo as only applying in cases where the defendant had not invoked his 
right to counsel. Id.  Because Forbush had invoked his right to counsel prior to interro­
gation, the court concluded that Edwards was controlling and Edwards prohibited in­
terrogating “a defendant who has invoked his right to counsel.” Id. at 757. While the 
outcome of Forbush was accurate, the applicability of the Edwards rule was not.  Nota­
bly, the Edwards rule only applies “when an accused has invoked his right to have 
counsel present during custodial interrogation.”  Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484­
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183 2012] RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN MASS. FOLLOWING MONTEJO 
While Montejo changed Sixth Amendment jurisprudence,136 
state courts must decide if Montejo also altered state law regarding 
the right to counsel.  In July of 2010, the Massachusetts Court of 
Appeals decided a case that was factually similar to Montejo.137  In 
Commonwealth v. Tlasek, Tlasek was arrested in connection with a 
housebreak and subsequently interrogated by the police while he 
was in custody, awaiting arraignment.138  At the time of his arrest 
and interview, the police were aware that Tlasek was represented 
by counsel regarding drug charges from a different case, but did not 
notify Tlasek’s counsel.139  Failing to notify Tlasek’s counsel, the 
police secured a Miranda waiver from Tlasek and then proceeded 
to ask him questions relating solely to the pending drug charges.140 
At trial for the drug charges, the judge denied Tlasek’s motion 
to suppress the statements he made during the police interroga­
tion.141  The trial court reasoned that Tlasek’s Sixth Amendment 
right to counsel had not attached because the purpose of the inter­
85 (1981) (emphasis added).  In Forbush the court found that because Forbush had 
invoked his right to counsel, the Edwards rule was controlling. Forbush, 796 N.W.2d at 
757.  However, Forbush invoked his right to counsel prior to the custodial interrogation, 
not during, as required for Edwards to apply. Id. at 744. Therefore, Edwards did not 
prohibit the questioning, and Forbush would have had to re-invoke his right to counsel 
during the interrogation for Edwards to apply, contrary to the court’s opinion. Id. at 
757 (stating that “Forbush was not required to ‘re-invoke’ his right to counsel when the 
investigators initiated interrogation”). 
134. Williams, 38 So.3d at 192.  In Williams v. State, the defendant argued that the 
police-initiated interrogation violated his right to counsel under both the Florida and 
United States Constitutions because it occurred outside of his counsel’s presence. Id. at 
190.  Observing Montejo’s acknowledgment that “states were free to continue prohibit­
ing these types of police-initiated interrogations under their own constitutions,” the 
court noted that “‘the decisions of the [United States Supreme] Court are not, and 
should not be dispositive of questions regarding rights guaranteed by counterpart provi­
sions of state law.’” Id. at 192.  Ultimately, the court did not address whether the 
waiver of Williams’ right to counsel was valid under the Florida Constitution, finding 
that Williams never initially invoked his right to counsel. Id. at 193. 
135. Commonwealth v. Tlasek, 930 N.E.2d 170, 173 (Mass. App. Ct. 2010). 
136. Vickery, 229 P.3d at 281. 
137. Tlasek, 930 N.E.2d at 171. 
138. Id. 
139. Id.  While Tlasek was “in custody, but before he had been arraigned on the 
Canton housebreak, the Canton police came unannounced to interview” Tlasek at the 
jail where he was being held. Id. 
140. Id.  During the interrogation Tlasek made inculpatory statements. Id.  Im­
mediately after making the statements he acknowledged his error stating, “‘he knew 
that he shouldn’t have spoken with [the Canton police] and now he’s hurt his [drug] 
case’”; Tlasek then ended the interview. Id.  Notably, throughout the interview the 
police asked no questions relating to the housebreak, which was the basis for Tlasek’s 
arrest and interrogation. Id. 
141. Id. at 172. 
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184 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:163 
rogation was to question him about the housebreak, charges on 
which he had not been arraigned.142  On appeal, the court held that 
Tlasek’s Sixth Amendment right had attached, but that under 
Montejo Tlasek had waived it by signing the Miranda waiver.143 
The appellate court made it clear that “[Tlasek’s] waiver of his 
Sixth Amendment right [did] not mean that he also necessarily 
waived his parallel right under art. 12.”144 
Although the court recognized that Tlasek had not automati­
cally waived his Article 12 right to counsel, the court did not ad­
dress the issue further,145 because on appeal Tlasek relied solely on 
a Sixth Amendment argument, even though Montejo had made that 
argument moot.146  Therefore, the court concluded that the Article 
12 issue was not properly before them.147 
This recognition by the Massachusetts Court of Appeals, that 
Tlasek’s waiver of his Sixth Amendment right did not automatically 
imply that he waived his Article 12 right, serves as the basis for the 
remainder of this Note.  This Note argues that based on prior Mas­
sachusetts case law concerning Article 12 and the Massachusetts ju­
diciary’s steps to preserve the attorney-client relationship, 
Massachusetts citizens should continue to be afforded greater pro­
tection under Article 12 than that currently afforded by the 
Montejo opinion. 
III. WISHING TO ABSTAIN: INTERPRETING ARTICLE 12 TO
 
PROTECT THE SANCTITY OF THE ATTORNEY­
CLIENT RELATIONSHIP
 
Part III of this Note analyzes the Massachusetts judiciary’s af­
firmative steps in safeguarding the sanctity of Article 12 by taking a 
broadly protective approach to the attorney-client relationship. 
This Note argues that based on this approach the Massachusetts 
judiciary should continue to construe Article 12 as requiring a 
bright-line rule that prohibits police-initiate interrogations in the 
142. Id. 
143. See id.  Implicit in the court’s holding that Tlasek waived his Sixth Amend­
ment right is the fact that it had attached at the time of the police interview. Id. 
144. Id. at 172-73. 
145. Id. at 173. 
146. Id. 
147. Id. at 173 n.6.  However, the court did discuss that in prior cases the SJC has 
held that Article 12 affords Massachusetts citizens greater protection than that provided 
by the Sixth Amendment. Id. 
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185 2012] RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN MASS. FOLLOWING MONTEJO 
post-arraignment context and rejects Miranda waivers in the same 
context. 
The initial question that must be addressed in deciding whether 
Massachusetts should afford their citizens greater protection than 
that afforded by Montejo is: does the rule in Montejo “adequately 
protect[ ] the rights of the citizens of Massachusetts?”148  When this 
question is answered in the affirmative, there is no need to create a 
separate state law rule.149  This Note argues that the Montejo rule 
does not adequately protect the citizens of Massachusetts. The re­
mainder of the Note will show why the federal rule is inadequate. 
The starting point in answering this question is an evaluation of the 
text of Article 12 and its federal counterpart, the Sixth 
Amendment. 
The textual similarities between the right to counsel provisions 
in Article 12 and the Sixth Amendment are striking.150  By their 
words, both guarantee an accused the right to have counsel for his 
defense.151  Article 12 provides that “every subject shall have a 
right . . . to be fully heard in his defence by himself, or his council 
[sic], at his election.”152  Similarly, the Sixth Amendment provides 
that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right 
to . . . have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.”153  Even 
though the texts are alike, textual similarities alone do not create a 
presumption that Massachusetts courts should defer to Supreme 
Court precedent.154  Rather, textual similarity is but one factor to 
be taken into consideration along with the “history . . . [and] prior 
interpretations of art. 12, as well as the jurisprudence existing in the 
Commonwealth.”155 
Although there may not be any notable textual difference be­
tween Article 12 and the Sixth Amendment, the history of Article 
148. Commonwealth v. Mavredakis, 725 N.E.2d 169, 177-78 (Mass. 2000). 
149. Commonwealth v. Simon, 923 N.E.2d. 58, 69 (Mass. 2010). 
150. Article 12’s right to counsel provision provides that: “every subject shall 
have a right to . . . be fully heard in his defence by himself, or his council [sic], at his 
election.” MASS. CONST. pt. 1, art. XII.  The Sixth Amendment in pertinent part pro­
vides: “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to . . . have the 
Assistance of Counsel for his defence.” U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
151. U.S. CONST. amend. VI; MASS. CONST. pt. 1, art. XII. 
152. MASS. CONST. pt. 1, art XII. 
153. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
154. See Leavens, supra note 20, at 97 (stating that “[t]here may be principled 
reasons for a state court to find different, more protective meaning for a common norm 
and to impose its version of that norm within its state, but it is almost never because the 
state and federal provisions have significantly different text”) (emphasis added). 
155. Commonwealth v. Murphy, 862 N.E.2d 30, 41 (Mass. 2007). 
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186 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:163 
12 coupled with prior interpretations by the SJC compel the conclu­
sion that the SJC should afford Massachusetts citizens greater pro­
tection than provided by Montejo. 
A. Safeguarding the Attorney-Client Relationship 
If Massachusetts were to follow the Montejo rule it would un­
dermine the safeguards the SJC has long recognized as important to 
the protection of the attorney-client relationship. Through the 
adoption of court rules156 and case law, the Massachusetts judiciary 
has taken a stance on ensuring defendants have the benefit of legal 
representation and have not tolerated tactics by the police aimed at 
circumventing Article 12. 
One of the SJC’s efforts to ensure that a criminal defendant’s 
right to rely on the assistance of counsel is not circumvented by the 
government appears in Commonwealth v. Manning.157  In Manning, 
the SJC preserved the attorney-client relationship by finding that 
efforts by drug enforcement agents “to induce the defendant to be­
come an inform[ant],” without notice to the defendant’s attorney, 
violated the defendant’s right to counsel.158  In so holding, the court 
stated that “[i]t is clear that [inducing] conduct amounted to unwar­
ranted interference with the relationship between the defendant 
and his attorney.  There is no justification for the Government to 
attempt to deal with the defendant behind the back of his coun­
sel.”159  Finding the conduct by the government agents to be so 
egregious, the court contemplated adopting “a per se rule which 
would mandate the dismissal of an indictment in cases in which gov­
156. See supra Part I.C. 
157. Commonwealth v. Manning, 367 N.E.2d 635, 636, 638 (Mass. 1977). 
158. Id. at 636.  In addition to urging the defendant to become an informant, the 
drug enforcement agent also “[d]uring the course of the conversation, . . . ‘made several 
disparaging remarks about [Manning’s] counsel and the manner in which he was con­
ducting the defense of the . . . case’ and ‘indicated that the tactics of defense counsel 
would not insure the defendant being kept out of jail.’” Id. at 636. 
159. Id. at 637.  The Commonwealth argued that the defendant was required to 
“show that he was actually prejudiced by the agents’ conduct” and because the defen­
dant could not show that, “any error was harmless.” Id. at 638.  The court rejected the 
Commonwealth’s argument and held that it 
need not invoke a presumption of prejudice, as implicit in the motion judge’s 
finding that there have been no “serious” impairment of the attorney-client 
relationship is a finding that the defendant had in fact been prejudiced to some 
extent. “The right to have the assistance of counsel is too fundamental and 
absolute to allow courts to indulge in nice calculations of prejudice arising 
from its denial.” 
Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 76 (1942)). 
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187 2012] RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN MASS. FOLLOWING MONTEJO 
ernment agents intentionally attempt to subvert the attorney-client 
relationship.”160  The court decided against the per se rule but cau­
tioned that “we wish to leave no doubt that such conduct will not be 
tolerated in our criminal justice system.”161  This warning by the 
court makes the SJC’s protective view of the attorney-client rela­
tionship undoubtedly apparent. 
Another instance in which the SJC has taken affirmative steps 
to safeguard the attorney-client relationship can be found in Com­
monwealth v. Mavredakis.162  In Mavredakis, the SJC’s holding that 
police officers had a duty to inform a suspect of an attorney’s ef­
forts to render assistance163 was grounded in protecting the attor­
ney-client relationship.164  In deciding not to defer to the Supreme 
Court’s holding that police had such a duty, the SJC said that the 
federal rule “would lend tacit approval to affirmative police inter­
ference with the attorney-client relationship”165—something the 
court was unwilling to do.166  In Mavredakis, the court stated that 
when an accused accepts an attorney’s assistance during interroga­
tion, “the police must suspend questioning until the suspect is af­
forded the opportunity to consult with the attorney.”167 
Analogously, if Montejo were followed in Massachusetts, it would 
allow police to question a defendant who has already accepted an 
attorney’s assistance, and has not yet had the opportunity to speak 
with his attorney. 
160. Id. at 639. 
161. Id. 
162. Commonwealth v. Mavredakis, 725 N.E.2d 169, 179 (Mass. 2000). 
163. Id. (holding that “the duty we announce concerns solely the obligation ‘to 
apprise the defendant of a specific communication from his attorney that bore directly 
on the right to counsel’”) (emphasis added) (quoting State v. Stoddard, 537 A.2d 446, 
453 (Conn. 1988)). 
164. See Commonwealth v. Murphy, 862 N.E.2d 30, 42 (Mass. 2007) (discussing 
the efforts the SJC has taken in safeguarding the attorney-client relationship). 
165. Mavredakis, 725 N.E.2d at 179.  To that point, the court further went on to 
adopt recognitions by other jurisdictions that 
there is an important difference between the abstract right to speak with an 
attorney . . . and a concrete opportunity to meet “with an identified attorney 
actually able to provide at least initial assistance and advice.” “Faced with a 
concrete offer of assistance . . . a suspect may well decide to reclaim his or her 
continuing right to legal assistance.” 
Id. at 178-79 (alteration in original) (citations omitted) (quoting State v. Haynes, 602 
P.2d 272, 278 (Or. 1979) and State v. Stoddard, 537 A.2d 446, 453 (Conn. 1998)). 
166. Id. at 176 (recognizing that under Moran “police had no duty to inform a 
suspect of an attorney’s efforts to render legal services when the suspect had not per­
sonally requested such legal representation”) (citing Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 
422, 432 (1986)). 
167. Id. at 180. 
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188 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:163 
Allowing the police to question a defendant who has already 
accepted an attorney’s assistance would have numerous negative 
consequences.  Notably, putting the Montejo rule into practice 
would render being represented in a custodial interrogation more 
burdensome than being unrepresented. For example, under 
Mavredakis when a suspect accepts an attorney’s offer of assistance 
during a custodial interrogation the police must halt questioning 
and cannot resume until the suspect speaks with the attorney.168 
Under a Montejo fact pattern, at the time the interrogation takes 
place, defendants have already accepted and invoked their right to 
counsel at arraignment, but have yet to speak with their counsel. 
Before the police have a duty to halt the interrogation under 
Montejo, the defendant has to re-invoke his right to counsel during 
the interrogation.169  Thus a represented defendant has a higher 
burden than an unrepresented suspect, which requires the repre­
sented defendant to invoke the right to counsel twice: once at ar­
raignment and again during the interrogation. 
Adherence to the Montejo rule would encourage police con­
duct aimed at circumventing Article 12, namely, interrogating de­
fendants who have just been arraigned, but have yet to have the 
opportunity to speak with their attorney.  When an accused is first 
brought into a custodial interrogation, pre-arraignment, the police 
have the opportunity to question him.  In Montejo, the defendant 
was questioned all afternoon, evening, and then into the next morn­
ing.170  After the accused becomes a charged defendant, and has 
secured an attorney, the only foreseeable benefit of allowing the 
police to interrogate him is to give the police another chance at 
obtaining a confession.  However, in the post-arraignment context, 
this confession comes at the hands of the police circumventing the 
defendant’s “right to rely on counsel as a ‘medium’ between him 
and the State.”171 
In attempting to obtain a post-arraignment confession the po­
lice are interfering with the relationship between the defendant and 
168. Id. 
169. Montejo v. Louisiana, 129 S. Ct. 2079, 2090 (2009).  “[A] defendant who 
does not want to speak to the police without counsel present need only say as much 
when he is first approached and given the Miranda warnings. At that point, not only 
must the immediate contact end, but “badgering” by later requests is prohibited.” Id. 
While this is true, thinking that they have already invoked their right to counsel at 
arraignment, most defendants will not be learned enough to know that they must again 
invoke it at the interrogation for their right to counsel to be respected and upheld. 
170. Id. at 2082. 
171. Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 176 (1985). 
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189 2012] RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN MASS. FOLLOWING MONTEJO 
his attorney, thereby degrading the safeguards the Massachusetts 
judiciary has put in place to protect that relationship.  Such a result 
would be a digression for the Massachusetts judiciary and, there­
fore, post-arraignment police-initiated interrogations should con­
tinue to be prohibited. 
Admittedly, there may come a time when an “emergency” situ­
ation arises in which time is crucial, and a defendant’s attorney can­
not be contacted prior to the questioning.  However, those 
situations should be rare, and if an emergency situation arises a de­
fendant should be notified, prior to questioning, that his attorney 
was not contacted before the defendant is asked to sign a Miranda 
waiver.  Additionally, the defendant’s attorney should be contacted 
at the first opportunity.  Aside from that exception, once a defen­
dant’s Article 12 right to counsel attaches, there should be a blanket 
prohibition on police-initiated interrogations of represented de­
fendants, thus advancing the SJC’s efforts to protect the attorney-
client relationship. 
B. Circumvention of Article 12 
The SJC has not only taken steps to safeguard the attorney-
client relationship, but also to ensure that law enforcement does 
“not . . . act in a manner that circumvents and thereby dilutes the 
protection afforded by the right to counsel.”172  In Hilton and How­
ard, the SJC expanded upon the Supreme Court’s efforts to stop 
law enforcement from confronting defendants without their coun­
sel’s knowledge.173  There, the court classified both social work­
ers174 and court officers as “government agents”175 in an effort to 
protect a defendant’s right to rely on the assistance of counsel when 
communicating with the government. 
Relying on Hilton, a Massachusetts Superior Court in Com­
monwealth v. Blagojevic reaffirmed the “broad prohibition” against 
efforts by law enforcement targeted at eliciting inculpatory state­
ments from represented defendants.176  Notably, the court’s holding 
that after the time of arraignment, the police were “obligated to 
172. Commonwealth v. Hilton, 823 N.E.2d 383, 398 (Mass. 2005) (quoting Maine 
v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 171 (1985)). 
173. Commonwealth v. Howard, 845 N.E.2d 368, 372 (Mass. 2006); Hilton, 823 
N.E.2d at 400-01; see supra Part I.D. 
174. Howard, 845 N.E.2d at 372-73. 
175. Hilton, 823 N.E.2d at 400. 
176. Commonwealth v. Blagojevic, No. 06-302, 2007 WL 969079, at *1 (Mass. 
Super. Ct. Feb. 28, 2007). 
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190 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:163 
refrain from any effort to question [the defendant] . . . in the ab­
sence of his counsel” was not rooted in the Jackson rule, but rather 
Massachusetts precedent and Maine v. Moulton.177 
Logically, holdings not based on Jackson should not be af­
fected by the Montejo rule.  However, the Blagojevic holding, 
prohibiting post-arraignment police interrogations in Massachu­
setts, is in danger of being overruled if Montejo were to be fol­
lowed. Montejo permits what Blagojevic explicitly prohibits: the 
questioning of defendants after arraignment without their counsel’s 
knowledge.178  In requesting counsel, or securing private counsel, 
the defendant should be interpreted as saying, “I only want to com­
municate through my attorney.”  By expressly choosing to have the 
assistance of counsel, a defendant invokes his right to rely on the 
assistance of counsel for the duration of litigation.  Allowing the 
police to initiate interrogations of defendants after their Article 12 
invocation negates their express choice. Thus, adherence to 
Montejo would undermine the rules the Massachusetts judiciary has 
put in place to preserve a defendant’s choice to have counsel. 
C. Miranda Warnings—Grossly Inadequate 
The Supreme Court in Miranda v. Arizona held that the Fifth 
Amendment’s privilege against self-incrimination carries with it 
certain procedural safeguards.179  Under Miranda, an individual in 
custody has the right to consult with an attorney and have an attor­
ney present during interrogation.180  Thus, with Miranda, the Su­
preme Court created “what may be best described as the ‘Miranda 
right to counsel,’” independent from the right to counsel guaran­
teed by the Sixth Amendment and Article 12.181  While the Court 
created this Miranda right to counsel, its only real purpose was to 
protect a suspect’s right to remain silent, and therefore “is [signifi­
cantly] narrower than the full-blooded Sixth Amendment” and Ar­
ticle 12 right to counsel.182  The Miranda right to counsel is nothing 
177. Id. at *2. 
178. Montejo v. Louisiana, 129 S. Ct. 2079, 2083, 2091 (2009) (discussing the Jack­
son rule, and Jackson’s overruling now means that Montejo allows post-arraignment 
police-initiated interrogations). 
179. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 479 (1966). 
180. Id. 
181. JOSHUA  DRESSLER & ALAN C. MICHAELS, UNDERSTANDING  CRIMINAL 
PROCEDURE: VOLUME 1: INVESTIGATION 417 (4th ed. 2006). 
182. Id.  Recognizing that due to Miranda’s narrower application, “[i]t is neces­
sary to treat the Miranda and Sixth Amendment versions of the right to counsel sepa­
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191 2012] RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN MASS. FOLLOWING MONTEJO 
more than a prophylactic safeguard,183 while the right to counsel in 
both Article 12184 and the Sixth Amendment is a “fundamental” 
constitutional right.185 
The holding in Montejo rests on the belief that Miranda warn­
ings adequately apprise defendants of the Sixth Amendment rights 
they are giving up,186 even though Miranda was designed to protect 
defendants’ Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination.187 
Thus, the Montejo Court concluded that “doctrines ensuring volun­
tariness of the Fifth Amendment waiver simultaneously ensure the 
voluntariness of the Sixth Amendment waiver.”188  Justice Stevens, 
in his dissenting opinion in Montejo, adamantly argued that Mi­
randa warnings were inadequate to ensure “that a defendant pos­
sess ‘a full awareness of both the nature of the right being 
abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon it.’”189 
Article 12 guarantees criminal defendants the right to have 
counsel for their defense.190  It gives a defendant the right to choose 
between two options: (1) to proceed with an attorney or (2) to elect 
to proceed without an attorney and represent himself.191  Article 12 
is enforced through SJC Rule 3:10, which requires the judge to ad­
rately. They attach at different times, under different circumstances, for different 
reasons, and with different effects.” Id. 
183. Id. at 416. 
184. Lavallee v. Justices in the Hampden Superior Court, 812 N.E.2d 895, 903 
(Mass. 2004). 
185. Jennifer Diana, Apples and Oranges and Olives? Oh My! Fellers, the Sixth 
Amendment, and the Fruit of the Poisonous Tree Doctrine, 71 BROOK. L. REV. 985, 1007 
(2005) (discussing the differences between the Fifth and Sixth Amendments). 
186. See Montejo v. Louisiana, 129 S. Ct. 2079, 2090 (2009) (reasoning that be­
cause Miranda warnings “suffice[ ] to protect the integrity of ‘a suspect’s voluntary 
choice not to speak outside his lawyer’s presence’ before his arraignment, it is hard to 
see why it would not also suffice to protect that same choice after arraignment, when 
Sixth Amendment rights have attached”) (citation omitted) (quoting Texas v. Cobb, 532 
U.S. 162, 175 (2001) (Kennedy, J., concurring)). 
187. Id.  Interestingly, the Court acknowledged the fact that Miranda was de­
signed to protect an accused’s Fifth Amendment right, but dismisses this glaring distinc­
tion as “irrelevant.” Id. 
188. Id. at 2089-90 (referring to Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 474 (1966); 
Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484 (1981); Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146, 153 
(1990)). 
189. Id. at 2101 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 
421 (1986)).  Stevens believed that because the Miranda warnings were insufficient to 
ensure Montejo understood the right he was giving up, “the record in this case pro-
vide[d] no basis for concluding that Montejo validly waived his right to counsel, even in 
the absence of Jackson’s enhanced protections.” Id. 
190. MASS. CONST. pt. 1, art. XII. 
191. See id. 
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192 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:163 
vise a defendant of his constitutional right to have an attorney 
available to him “at public expense if necessary.”192 
For a defendant to effectuate a waiver of the right to counsel at 
an arraignment or similar proceeding, “the waiver must ‘be volun­
tary’ and must involve ‘an informed and intentional relinquishment 
of a known right.’”193  When a defendant elects to proceed pro se, 
the judge must ensure that the defendant has “a sense of the magni­
tude of the undertaking and the disadvantages of self-representa­
tion.”194  Moreover, a defendant must be fully apprised of “the 
seriousness of the charge and of the penalties he may be exposed to 
before deciding to take a chance on his own skill.”195  Inherent in 
the right of a defendant to proceed pro se is the judicial recognition 
that average defendants are not capable of representing 
themselves.196 
1. Post-Arraignment Waiver 
The decision to waive one’s Article 12 right to counsel in a 
post-arraignment custodial interrogation context is also a monu­
mental decision.  While the defendant is not completely waiving his 
right to counsel for the remainder of the criminal prosecution, he is 
waiving counsel at a stage deemed to be “critical.”197  Similar to 
when a defendant waives his right to counsel at an arraignment and 
elects to proceed pro se, in a custodial interrogation the defendant 
must waive his right to counsel on an informed and intentional ba­
sis, with the knowledge of the right he is giving up.198 
Waiving the right to counsel at a police-initiated custodial in­
terrogation is a decision that can shape the rest of the criminal pro­
ceedings.  More importantly, it is a decision that could dictate the 
outcome of the accused’s trial: “[g]iven the realities of modern 
criminal prosecution, the critical proceedings at which counsel’s as­
192. Rules of the Court, 416 Mass. 1301, 1309 (1993) (successor of original rule). 
193. Commonwealth v. Means, 907 N.E.2d 646, 656 (Mass. 2009) (quoting Com­
monwealth v. Torres, 813 N.E.2d 1216, 1276 (2004)). 
194. Commonwealth v. Lee, 475 N.E.2d 363, 368 (Mass. 1985) (quoting Maynard 
v. Meachum, 545 F.2d 273, 279 (1st Cir. 1976) (internal quotations omitted)). 
195. Id. 
196. Commonwealth v. Martin, 683 N.E.2d 280, 283 (Mass. 1997) (recognizing 
“the obvious truth that the average defendant lacks the skill necessary to protect one­
self in a criminal proceeding”). 
197. Montejo v. Louisiana, 129 S. Ct. 2079, 2085 (2009). 
198. Commonwealth v. Anderson, 862 N.E.2d 749, 756 (Mass. 2007) (“‘To be 
valid, [a] waiver must be voluntary, and there must be an informed and intentional 
relinquishment of a known right.’”) (quoting Commonwealth v. Torres, 813 N.E.2d 
1261, 1276 (2004)). 
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193 2012] RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN MASS. FOLLOWING MONTEJO 
sistance is required more and more often occur outside the court­
room in pretrial proceedings ‘where the results might well settle the 
accused’s fate and reduce the trial itself to a mere formality.’”199  In 
Montejo, after the defendant gave the Miranda waiver, he wrote a 
letter of confession that was admitted against him at trial and ulti­
mately led to his conviction and subsequent death sentence.200 
Due to the consequences that waiving the right to counsel can 
have, post-arraignment waivers of the right to counsel are scruti­
nized closely in Massachusetts.  In Commonwealth v. Anderson, the 
SJC was faced with a defendant who had been assigned counsel, but 
had not yet met his counsel when he initiated contact with the po­
lice.201  During the custodial interrogation, Anderson signed a Mi­
randa waiver after being apprised of the fact that he had been 
assigned counsel.202  Ultimately, the court upheld the waiver, find­
ing it conclusive that the defendant was the one who initiated the 
contact.203  In reaching that conclusion the court stated that a post-
arraignment waiver of the defendant’s Article 12 right to counsel in 
a custodial interrogation “without the benefit of counsel’s presence 
or advice is particularly suspect.”204  Notably, even when the defen­
dant initiates contact with the police, every reasonable presumption 
199. Montejo, 129 S. Ct. at 2099 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (emphasis added) (quot­
ing United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 224 (1967)).  Justice Stevens analogizes the 
Court’s decision in Wade, which held a post-indictment lineup was a critical stage of 
criminal proceedings based on the belief that counsel’s presence was imperative, to the 
post-arraignment custodial interrogations. Id.  Further, in Moulton, the Court recog­
nized that “to deprive a person of counsel during the period prior to trial may be more 
damaging than denial of counsel during the trial itself.”  Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 
159, 170 (1985) (emphasis added). 
200. Montejo, 129 S. Ct. at 2082. 
201. Anderson, 862 N.E.2d at 756-57. 
202. Id. at 757.  The police were aware of the fact that the defendant’s attorney 
had requested that they not interview the defendant because the attorney had sent the 
police a letter that stated: “‘no attempt should be made to interrogate Mr. Anderson or 
to obtain any physical or documentary evidence from him without my knowledge and 
express approval.’” Id. at 754.  Further, the SJC stated that the case would have been 
decided differently under Article 12 if the defendant had not been informed of his 
counsel’s entry into the case or that his counsel requested that he not be interviewed. 
Id. at 757.  If that had been the case, “[a] waiver obtained in such circumstances would 
not be knowing and intelligent within the meaning of art. 12.” Id. 
203. Id. at 756-57.
 
Anderson initiated contact with [the police] after learning of his indictment;
 
was advised fully of his Miranda rights, including his right to consult with
 
counsel and to have counsel present . . . [i]n these circumstances, the judge’s
 
conclusion that Anderson intentionally, knowingly, and voluntarily waived his
 
Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights to counsel . . . was constitutionally sound.
 
Id. 
204. Id. at 758. 
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194 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:163 
against waiver is given.205  Nevertheless, in that case, the Miranda 
waiver was upheld due to the defendant initiating contact with the 
police. 
In factual situations similar to Montejo and Jackson, where the 
defendants do not initiate contact with the police and have not yet 
met their respective attorneys, Miranda warnings are grossly inade­
quate to ensure that defendants are knowledgeable about the Arti­
cle 12 right they are giving up.  In a pre-arraignment custodial 
interrogation in which the right to counsel has not yet attached,206 
Miranda warnings adequately apprise a suspect of the right he is 
giving up by speaking to the police, that is, the right against self-
incrimination.  But, in the post-arraignment context, when Article 
12 has attached207 and the accused is represented by counsel, the 
accused is now a charged defendant, and the Miranda warnings 
which were sufficient pre-arraignment become inadequate to fully 
inform a defendant of the Article 12 right he is surrendering. 
The facts of both Montejo and Jackson bring to light the inade­
quacies of Miranda warnings in a post-arraignment context.  In 
Montejo and Jackson neither defendant had the opportunity to 
meet, let alone speak to, his attorney before the police sought him 
out for interrogation, knowing the defendant had been appointed 
counsel.208  At the time, Montejo, Jackson, and Bladel signed their 
respective Miranda waivers they surely were not fully aware of the 
seriousness of their charges and the legal ramifications of speaking 
with the police outside of the presence of each of their attorneys.  If 
waivers are viewed as “particularly suspect”209 by the SJC even 
when the defendant initiates contact with the government,210 they 
should be wholly invalid when the police initiate contact, especially 
in cases in which the defendant has not even had the opportunity to 
receive any legal advice whatsoever. 
The most efficient and adequate way to ensure that repre­
sented defendants who do not initiate contact with the police are 
adequately protected is to continue to prohibit police-initiated in­
terrogations of represented defendants.  By adhering to this prohi­
205. Id. 
206. In a pre-arraignment custodial interrogation, Article 12 has not yet been 
triggered due to the fact that “judicial proceedings [have not] commenced.” Id. at 756. 
207. In the post-arraignment context the “judicial proceedings” have commenced 
and therefore the Article 12 right to counsel has attached. See id. 
208. Montejo v. Louisiana, 129 S. Ct. 2079, 2082 (2009); Michigan v. Jackson, 475 
U.S. 625, 627-28 (1986), overruled by Montejo, 129 S. Ct. at 2091. 
209. Anderson, 862 N.E.2d at 758. 
210. See supra note 205 and accompanying text. 
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195 2012] RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN MASS. FOLLOWING MONTEJO 
bition, the courts would not have to indulge in the game of deciding 
when a waiver of the right to counsel is or is not valid in a post-
arraignment custodial interrogation.  Consequently, all waivers of 
counsel in such a setting would be automatically invalid and there­
fore inadmissible in court. 
2. Changing Miranda 
An alternative to a blanket prohibition would be to modify the 
Miranda warnings for post-arraignment waivers.  In Common­
wealth v. Anderson, the police advised Anderson during the inter­
rogation of “his right to consult with counsel and to have counsel 
present” and the fact that an attorney from the Committee for Pub­
lic Counsel Services had been appointed to represent him.211  Find­
ing the warnings to be sufficient, the court went on to place 
emphasis on the police explicitly telling Anderson of his attorney’s 
entry into the case.212 Anderson is distinguishable from cases such 
as Montejo because Anderson was unaware that he had been as­
signed an attorney until the time of the interview.  However, the 
more extended warnings from Anderson can be used as a starting 
point to alter the Miranda rule.213 
Anderson warnings would inform defendants that: (1) they 
have already been appointed counsel; (2) they have the right to 
consult with their counsel; (3) they have the right to have counsel 
present before speaking with the police; (4) their counsel is not 
aware of the current interrogation; and (5) by signing the Miranda 
waiver, they are saying that they want to talk to the police without 
notifying their attorney.214  The Anderson court believed that such 
211. Anderson, 862 N.E.2d at 757. 
212. Id.  Importantly, at the time Anderson’s attorney had been assigned to the 
case, Anderson had not requested counsel and therefore did not know prior to the 
interview of his attorney’s entry. Id. at 745. 
213. Id. 
214. The proposed “Anderson warnings” are modified to fit cases with facts simi­
lar to Montejo.  Unlike in Anderson, the defendant in Montejo was aware that an attor­
ney was going to be appointed for him.  Montejo v. Louisiana, 129 S. Ct. 2079, 2082 
(2009).  In Anderson, the police were aware that Anderson’s attorney did not want 
Anderson interrogated outside of his presence, and the police advised Anderson of 
that, but in a factual setting such as Montejo, a defendant’s attorney is not aware of the 
interrogation so the police would not need to advise the defendant of the attorney’s 
supposed view of the interrogation. Anderson, 862 N.E.2d at 757.  However, for the 
warnings to be effective the police would need to notify defendants like Montejo, that 
their attorneys are unaware of the interrogation, and the legal ramifications of talking 
to the police. 
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196 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:163 
a warning would effectively ensure that a defendant was aware of 
the Article 12 right he was waiving.215 
IV.	 WHEN WISHING FAILS: THE BROAD IMPLICATIONS 
OF MONTEJO 
The previous section established that the Massachusetts judici­
ary’s broad interpretation of Article 12 was aimed at protecting the 
attorney-client relationship.  Part IV brings to light the broad impli­
cations that post-arraignment police-initiated interrogations would 
have on the citizens of Massachusetts. 
In Commonwealth v. Lavallee, the SJC stated that “[t]he duty 
to provide counsel to indigent criminal defendants belongs to the 
State, and the State is in the best position to enforce that duty.”216 
Furthermore, since the State is in the best position to enforce the 
duty to provide counsel, the State should also be in the best posi­
tion to oversee that the protections that come with it are upheld.  If 
a rule by the Supreme Court inadequately protects the right to 
counsel, Massachusetts courts should continue to afford their citi­
zens greater protection under Article 12. This section will examine 
1) the impact that following Montejo’s lead would have on suscepti­
ble defendants and 2) the loophole that Montejo has created for the 
police, arguing that due to both of these factors, the Montejo rule 
inadequately protects a defendant’s Article 12 right to counsel. 
A. Susceptible Defendants 
The Montejo opinion relies on the assumption that defendants 
are adequately capable of facing the government on their own: 
“[a]ny criminal defendant learned enough to order his affairs based 
on the rule announced in Jackson would also be perfectly capable 
of interacting with the police on his own.”217  However, that as­
215. Anderson, 862 N.E.2d at 757. While changing the Miranda warnings is an 
alternative, it would be impractical and burdensome to create another set of warnings 
that apply solely to post-arraignment police-initiated interrogations.  Continued adher­
ence to the rule prohibiting post-arraignment police-initiated interrogations would take 
no effort at all, and would continue to provide a bright-line easy-to-apply rule for law 
enforcement.  The magnitude of the decision to waive the assistance of counsel, as well 
as the repercussions of effectuating such a waiver brings to light the reality that a Mi­
randa waiver does not fully apprise a defendant of the Article 12 right he is surrender­
ing, thus requiring the conclusion that Massachusetts should continue to adhere to the 
rule prohibiting such interrogations. 
216. Lavallee v. Justices in the Hampden Superior Court, 812 N.E.2d 895, 907 
(Mass. 2004). 
217. Montejo, 129 S. Ct. at 2089. 
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sumption is flawed in two respects.  First, it negates the belief that 
“[t]he simple fact that [the] defendant has requested an attorney 
indicates that he does not believe that he is sufficiently capable of 
dealing with his adversaries singlehandedly.”218  Second, it does not 
take into account that Miranda warnings are confusing to not only 
the average defendant, but also “vulnerable defendants”219 in the 
context of post-arraignment custodial interrogations. 
The Supreme Court has a long-standing belief that the legal 
system is complex to even the most educated and sophisticated de­
fendants.220  If the intelligent and educated defendants are ill 
equipped to face the legal system on their own, “how much more 
true is it of the ignorant and illiterate, or those of feeble intel­
lect?”221  Recently in 2010, the American Psychology-Law Society 
218. Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625, 633 n.7 (1986), overruled by Montejo, 129 
S. Ct. at 2091 (2009) (quoting People v. Bladel, 365 N.W.2d 56, 67 (Mich. 1984)).  Addi­
tionally, the Court adopted the belief that, “[w]hen an accused requests an attorney, 
either before a police officer or a magistrate, he does not know which constitutional 
right he is invoking; he therefore should not be expected to articulate exactly why or for 
what purposes he is seeking counsel.” Id. (quoting Bladel, 365 N.W.2d at 67). 
219. Brief for National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, et al. as Amici 
Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Montejo v. Louisiana, 129 S. Ct. 2079 (2009) (No. 07­
1529), 2009 WL 1007119, *3.  Reference to “vulnerable defendants” comes from the 
amici brief filed in support of Petitioner, Montejo: 
The Jackson rule ensures that the right to assistance of counsel does not be­
come a meaningless abstraction, easily lost when police confront the defen­
dant outside the presence of counsel. . . .  [C]oncerns undergirding the Jackson 
rule are magnified for particularly vulnerable defendants, including the men­
tally and developmentally disabled, juveniles, those lacking education, those 
with substance addiction, and the indigent. These defendants are especially 
vulnerable to police suggestion that counsel is unnecessary, many such defend­
ants lack the capacity to appreciate the importance of counsel . . . . 
Id. at *2-3 (emphasis added); see also Dearborn, supra note 57, at 373 (finding that 
“[t]he great weight of evidence indicates most suspects do not understand their Mi­
randa rights and are therefore unable to waive them validly without first speaking to 
counsel”). 
220. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68-69 (1932) (recognizing that, “[e]ven the 
intelligent and educated layman has small and sometimes no skill in the science of law 
. . . [h]e requires the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings against 
him”) (emphasis added). 
221. Id.; see also Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 462-63 (1938) (holding that 
“[t]he Sixth Amendment stands as a constant admonition that if the constitutional safe­
guards it provides be lost, justice will not ‘still be done.’  It embodies a realistic recogni­
tion of the obvious truth that the average defendant does not have the professional 
legal skill to protect himself when brought before a tribunal with power to take his life 
or liberty, wherein the prosecution is presented by experienced and learned counsel. 
That which is simple, orderly, and necessary to the lawyer, to the untrained layman, 
may appear intricate, complex and mysterious”). 
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published an Article dealing with police-induced confessions and 
Miranda warnings,222 finding that 
studies have repeatedly shown that a substantial proportion of 
adults with mental disabilities, and “average” adolescents below 
age 16 have impaired understanding of Miranda warnings when 
they are exposed to them.  Even adults and youth who under­
stand them sometimes do not grasp their basic implications.223 
Due to their inability to understand the warnings, vulnerable de­
fendants were found to be more susceptible to waiving their 
rights.224 
Given the reality that even average defendants are perplexed 
by Miranda warnings, in the post-arraignment setting when a defen­
dant has already secured a lawyer it is “confusing and counterintui­
tive” for defendants to be told that they have the right to have an 
attorney appointed.225  Not only is it confusing, but coupled with 
the fact that vulnerable defendants already have an “impaired un­
derstanding of Miranda warnings”226 it is imperative that such de­
222. Saul M. Kassin et al., Police-Induced Confessions: Risk Factors and Recom­
mendations, 34 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 3, 3 (2010) (discussing the issue of false confes­
sions i.e., innocent people who had falsely confessed and were then convicted at trial). 
The Article noted that 
some studies have found that poor comprehension of Miranda warnings is it­
self predictive of a propensity to give false confessions.  Sometimes this stems 
from a desire to comply; at other times it appears to be related to a naı̈ve 
belief that one’s actual innocence will eventually prevail—a belief that is not 
confined to adolescents or persons with disabilities. 
Id. at 19 (citations omitted).  Given the correlation between an impaired understanding 
of Miranda warnings and false confessions, what value does a false confession add to 
the “truth seeking process?”  Ensuring that in the post-arraignment context defendants 
have the benefits of their legal counsel during a police-initiated interrogation would cut 
down on the likelihood of false confessions attributed to an impaired understanding of 
Miranda warnings.  A defendant’s counsel would be able to fully explain to a defendant 
all of the negative consequences that waiving Miranda rights could have, and therefore 
would lead to a better comprehension of Miranda warnings. 
223. Id. at 14-15. 
224. Id. at 19 (finding that vulnerable defendants “often lack the capacity to 
weigh the consequences of rights waiver, and are more greatly susceptible to waiving 
their rights as a matter of mere compliance with authority”). 
225. See Emily Bretz, Note, Don’t Answer the Door: Montejo v. Louisiana Re­
laxes Police Restrictions for Questioning Non-Custodial Defendants, 109 MICH. L. REV. 
221, 244-45 (2010) (arguing that “[t]he fact that, post-Montejo, represented defendants 
have to repeatedly reassert their desire to have an attorney present during interrogation 
is confusing and counterintuitive, not only for the average defendant, but especially for 
those who are more vulnerable”). 
226. Kassin et al., supra note 222, at 14-15; see also Dearborn, supra note 57, at 
362-63 (advocating for “the Sixth Amendment right to counsel to attach the moment 
Miranda warnings are required” due to suspects’ impaired understanding of Miranda). 
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fendants have an opportunity to consult with their attorney prior to 
any police-initiated custodial interrogation.  Interpreting Article 12 
to allow post-arraignment police-initiated interrogations in the ab­
sence of a defendant’s attorney would inadequately protect repre­
sented defendants.  Further, it would negate the defendant’s choice 
to proceed with the help of an attorney, a choice that is protected 
by Article 12 and that is in place to protect a defendant at critical 
confrontations with the government.227 
B. The Montejo Loophole: Non-Custodial Interrogations 
By overruling Jackson, the Montejo Court left the door open 
for police to interrogate represented defendants, not only in a cus­
todial setting, but also in a non-custodial setting, where a defendant 
has no Miranda protections.228  Part of the rationale for overruling 
Jackson was the Court’s belief that it was superfluous, because Mi­
randa and its progeny sufficiently protected a defendant’s right to 
counsel.229  However, Miranda, Edwards, and Minnick: “appl[y] 
only in the context of custodial interrogation”230 making the Jack­
227. Commonwealth v. Anderson, 862 N.E.2d 749, 755-56 (Mass. 2007) (recogniz­
ing that “art. 12 confer[s] the right to the assistance and advice of counsel in order to 
protect the unaided layman at critical confrontations with the government after being 
charged with a specific crime”). 
228. See Todd C. Berg, U.S. Supreme Court Expands Police, ‘Interrogation’ 
Power, Overruling 23-Year-Old Decision, MICH. LAWYERS  WEEKLY, June 1, 2009 
(“Montejo’s biggest impact will be felt by those defendants who aren’t in jail . . . . 
Because the ‘protections of Miranda and Edwards expire when a defendant is released 
from custody,’ . . . Jackson used to pick up the slack by deterring the police from trying 
to interrogate defendants.  Now, under Montejo . . . those same defendants are ‘fair 
game.’”). 
229. Montejo v. Louisiana, 129 S. Ct. 2079, 2089-90 (2009). 
230. Id.  The Court in Montejo found it irrelevant that Miranda and its progeny 
were, “designed to protect Fifth Amendment, not Sixth Amendment, rights” because 
“[w]hat matters is that these cases, like Jackson, protect the right to have counsel dur­
ing custodial interrogation.” Id. at 2090 (emphasis added).  However, if a defendant is 
not in custody, then Miranda does not apply: 
Montejo also correctly observes that the Miranda-Edwards regime is narrower 
than Jackson in one respect: The former applies only in the context of custo­
dial interrogation.  If the defendant is not in custody then those decisions do 
not apply; nor do they govern other, noninterrogative types of interactions 
between the defendant and the State (like pretrial lineups). 
Id.; see also Richard W. Bishop, Constitutional Defenses—Confessions, 17B MASS. 
PRAC., PRIMA  FACIE  CASE § 53.136 (5th ed., 2010) (“Miranda warnings are required 
only when interrogation is custodial in nature.  A person in custody is not entitled to 
Miranda warnings unless he is subjected to interrogation or its functional equivalent.”); 
Bretz, supra note 225 at 237 (discussing that “[b]ecause Miranda referred specifically to 
custodial interrogations, only defendants in police custody are entitled to its protec­
tions, and to the related rights guaranteed by Edwards v. Arizona”). 
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son rule in a non-custodial interrogation not only necessary, but 
imperative to preserve a defendant’s Article 12 right to counsel. 
The phrase “custodial interrogation” refers to “‘questioning in­
itiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken 
into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any 
significant way.’”231  In Commonwealth v. Bryant, the SJC found 
that a confession obtained by the police that “took place during a 
friendly chat in the defendant’s home” was non-custodial in na­
ture,232 and consequently, the Miranda requirement was not trig­
gered.233  Notably, at the time the non-custodial interrogation took 
place the defendant’s Article 12 right to counsel had not attached. 
If it had, the Jackson rule would have prohibited the police from 
interrogating the defendant, regardless of whether it was a non-cus­
todial interrogation. 
If Massachusetts were to follow Montejo, no constitutional 
safeguards would protect represented defendants in a non-custodial 
interrogation from the police coming to their door and interrogat­
ing them. The Montejo Court was of the belief that these types of 
non-custodial interrogations “are the least likely to pose a risk of 
coerced waivers.”234  However, recent studies have found “that 
231. Commonwealth v. Bryant, 459 N.E.2d 792, 797 (Mass. 1984) (recognizing 
that “police are not required to give [Miranda] warnings every time they interview a 
witness, but only when the witness is in ‘custody’”).  In determining whether “the inter­
rogation has taken place in custodial circumstances” the SJC has stated, 
[t]he difficulties inherent in determining whether a given confrontation be­
tween suspect and police is appropriately characterized as custodial derive 
from the necessity of answering what is essentially a subjective inquiry-
whether, from the point of view of the person being questioned, the interroga­
tion took place in a coercive environment-by reference to objective indicia. 
Id. 
232. Id. at 798. 
233. Id.  The SJC spelled out four factors that are taken into account in determin­
ing whether an interrogation is custodial in nature: 
(1) the place of the interrogation; (2) whether the investigation has begun to 
focus on the suspect, including whether there is probable cause to arrest the 
suspect; (3) the nature of the interrogation, including whether the interview 
was aggressive or, instead, informal and influenced in its contours by the sus­
pect; and (4) whether, at the time the incriminating statement was made, the 
suspect was free to end the interview by leaving the locus of the interrogation 
or by asking the interrogator to leave, as evidenced by whether the interview 
terminated with the defendant’s arrest. 
Id.  Applying those factors to the case the court found that: the interrogation took place 
in the defendant’s home, “the interview itself was informal, and the questioning unag­
gressive” therefore leading the court to conclude that the interrogation was non-custo­
dial in nature. Id. 
234. Montejo, 129 S.Ct at 2090. To that point, the Court went on to qualify their 
belief, “[w]hen a defendant is not in custody, he is in control, and need only shut his 
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since Miranda, police have intentionally focused their efforts on se­
curing inculpatory statements from defendants in non-custodial in­
terrogations.”235  Adherence to Montejo would promote police 
conduct aimed at targeting represented defendants in a non-custo­
dial setting, in hopes of obtaining a confession. 
Moreover, continued adherence to Jackson provides an easy­
to-apply bright-line rule. The SJC has recognized that “difficulties 
[are] inherent” in deciding whether an interrogation was custodial 
or non-custodial.236  Adherence to Jackson would eliminate those 
difficulties by prohibiting police-initiated interrogations of repre­
sented defendants regardless of whether the interrogation was cus­
todial or non-custodial in nature.  Even the majority in Montejo 
conceded that “[a] bright-line rule like that adopted in Jackson en­
sures that no fruits of interrogations made possible by badgering-
induced involuntary waivers are ever erroneously admitted at 
trial.”237 
C. Right to Initiate Contact 
While this Note argues that Massachusetts should prohibit po­
lice-initiated interrogations of represented defendants, it does not 
foreclose the right of the defendant to initiate contact with the po­
lice.  If a defendant contacts the police without notifying his coun­
sel, he does so at his own risk.  In Commonwealth v. Anderson, 
following the Jackson rule, the SJC noted that “‘nothing . . . pre­
vents a suspect charged with a crime and represented by counsel 
[from] . . . speak[ing] with police in the absence of an attorney.”’238 
When the defendant initiated contact with the police he had 
the opportunity to consult with his counsel before doing so,239 and 
therefore the concerns that are present when the police initiate con­
tact are not as apparent.  However, even though a defendant can 
initiate contact with the police, it is important to recognize that any 
waiver of counsel in that defendant-initiated interrogation is still 
door or walk away to avoid police badgering.  And noninterrogative interactions with 
the State do not involve the ‘inherently compelling pressures,’ that one might reasona­
bly fear could lead to involuntary waivers.” Id. (citations omitted). 
235. Bretz, supra note 225, at 238. 
236. Bryant, 459 N.E.2d at 797. 
237. Montejo, 129 S. Ct. at 2089. 
238. Commonwealth v. Anderson, 862 N.E.2d 749, 756 (Mass. 2007) (quoting 
Michigan v. Harvey, 494 U.S. 344, 352 (1990)). 
239. Id. at 754-55. 
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“particularly suspect.”240  Implicit in this recognition is that regard­
less of whether the defendant initiates contact with the police, once 
the Article 12 right to counsel has attached and has been invoked 
by the defendant, the defendant is unlikely to waive that right 
knowingly. 
CONCLUSION 
The SJC has recognized, time and again, that the Massachu­
setts Declaration of Rights can afford its citizens greater protection 
than the Bill of Rights to the United States Constitution.241  The 
history of the right to counsel in Massachusetts demonstrates the 
Commonwealth’s longstanding record of being proactive in both af­
fording indigent criminal defendants the right to counsel before the 
United States Supreme Court and expanding the right to counsel 
when the Supreme Court has limited it. 
When faced with following the United States Supreme Court’s 
holding in Montejo, a decision which this Note argues would de­
grade the right to counsel, Massachusetts courts should continue 
the prohibition that is in place which forbids police-initiated inter­
rogations of represented defendants.  Any other result would be in­
consistent with the steps the SJC has taken to safeguard the 
attorney-client relationship and the right of a defendant to rely on 
the assistance of counsel at all “critical stages.”242  Certainly society 
does have a valid interest in convicting and punishing criminals, but 
that right is not absolute nor should it be allowed to trump the con­
stitutional right to counsel afforded by Article 12. 
Adherence to pre-Montejo law would continue to provide a 
bright-line, workable rule.  The SJC has said that the purpose of an 
exclusionary rule is to: “compel respect for the constitutional guar­
anty in the only effectively available way-by removing the incentive 
to disregard it.”243  By continuing the prohibition on police-initiated 
interrogations of represented defendants and deeming any waivers 
of the right to counsel at those interrogations invalid, Massachusetts 
240. Id. at 758 (discussing that, “[a]mong the important circumstances to be con­
sidered, of course, are whether the waiver was obtained in a custodial setting and 
whether it was obtained either in the absence of counsel’s presence or in the absence of 
the defendant’s having had the opportunity to consult with counsel”). 
241. E.g., Commonwealth v. Hodge, 434 N.E.2d 1246, 1249 (Mass. 1982). 
242. Lavalle v. Justices in Hampden Superior Court, 812 N.E.2d 895, 903 (Mass. 
2004) (stating that “[t]he right to counsel extends to every ‘critical stage’ of the criminal 
process”); see also supra note 227 and accompanying text. 
243. Commonwealth v. Lora, 886 N.E.2d 688, 698 (Mass. 2008) (quoting United 
States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347 (1974)). 
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would ensure that the protections afforded by Article 12 do not 
become mere abstractions. 
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